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Abstract
This thesis contains three independent chapters aimed at increasing our understand-
ing of the effects of Internet diffusion on politics and development. The first chapter
proposes a novel methodology for measuring Internet penetration. Using IP geolo-
cation data, a new measure of Internet access is created, which counts the number
of IP addresses per person in a region. This is the first measure of Internet penetra-
tion that is comparable not only across countries but across sub-regions of countries
such as states or even electoral districts. The second chapter applies this measure to
test whether Internet diffusion can weaken incumbent power in a semi-authoritarian
regime. Using Malaysia as a test case, I find that the Internet is responsible for a
six point swing away from the incumbent party in the 2008 elections. In the third
chapter, co-authored with Valentino Larcinese, we look at the effects of the Inter-
net on U.S. presidential elections. In accordance with anecdotal evidence, we find
that increased Internet penetration leads to an increase in small donations to the
Democratic Party and a swing towards the Democratic presidential candidate.
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Preface
Since its inception in the 1980s the Internet has grown from an obscure project of the
U.S. Department of Defense to a medium used by billions to communicate, find in-
formation, trade opinions, view content, and connect. Unlike previous technological
innovations of the 20th century like radio and television, the Internet is less beholden
to national boundaries and much more difficult to regulate. As a result, in much
of the world, content is less controlled on the Internet than it is on other mediums.
For example, it is possible to access political content that, in some countries, could
never be printed in newspapers. Content of all kinds can be downloaded, bringing
libraries worth of information to users previously starved of content, some of it free
but much of it proprietary. The Internet also brings new kinds of engagement: the
ability to meet new people who share similar interests or simply comment on the
same posts; instantaneous updates about friends who live on the other side of the
globe; advertisements tailored to individual browsing patterns.
With the phenomenal growth of the Internet has come equally phenomenal claims
about its influence on our lives. The Internet has been credited with bringing great
economic benefit, with many regions attempting to duplicate the successes of Silicon
Valley and Bangalore. The Internet is also seen to foment political change, whether
it be Obama’s victory in the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, protests in Russia,
or the “Facebook” revolution in Egypt. But to date most evidence is anecdotal.
There is very little agreement as to whether the Internet actually has as large of an
effect as some have claimed, and much less of an idea of what kind of effect that it
might have. This thesis aims to broaden our knowledge of this understudied area,
providing some of the first evidence on the effects of Internet based media on the
political economy both of industrialized and developing countries.
Chapter 1, addresses one of the main obstacles to empirical research on the Internet,
a lack of reliable data. Today there is no publicly available, official data on Internet
usage at the sub-national level. This chapter aims to fill this gap, proposing a new
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method for measuring Internet usage based on IP geolocation data, a dataset which
matches IP addresses with physical locations. Using Malaysia as a test case, I create
a measure for Internet penetration at the state electoral district level. I show that
this is a strong measure, with a high degree of correlation with official survey data
on fraction of households with Internet subscriptions.
Chapter 2, tests whether the introduction of the internet can undermine incumbent
power in a semi-authoritarian regime. I use Malaysia as a test case, where the
incumbent coalition lost its 40-year monopoly on power in 2008. I draw upon the
methodology from Chapter 1 to construct a measure of Internet penetration for
the 2004 to 2008 period in Malaysia. Using an instrumental variable approach to
account for endogenous internet placement, I find that areas with higher internet
penetration experience higher voter turnout and higher candidate turnover, with the
internet accounting for one-third of the 11% swing against the incumbent party in
2008. In fact, the results suggest that, in the absence of the internet, the opposition
would not have achieved its historic upset in the 2008 elections.
Finally, in chapter 3, co-authored with Dr. Valentino Larcinese, we analyze the
Internet’s effect on the 2008 U.S. presidential elections. According to anecdotal
evidence, the internet is said to have played a key role: the Obama campaign’s online
fundraising arm brought in a record $500 billion in small individual donations; and
the campaign’s heavy use of social media purportedly contributed to the highest rate
of youth turnout since voting was extended to 18-year-olds. We test these assertions
exploiting geographic discontinuities along state borders with different right-of-way
laws, which determine the cost of building new infrastructure. We find that areas
with higher internet growth are more likely to swing to the Democratic presidential
nominee and are more likely to provide small donations to the Democratic Party.
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1 Measuring Internet Diffusion from
IP Addresses
1.1 Introduction
The Internet has been in existence for well over twenty years, and yet we know
surprisingly little about it, lacking reliable, comparable sub-national data on In-
ternet topology, infrastructure, supply, and usage. This a problem evident even in
the United States, the birthplace of the Internet, which didn’t draw up a map of
broadband availability until 2009.
Reliable data on the extent and usage of the Internet is of critical importance. First,
it would facilitate decision-making by policy-makers. All around the world, govern-
ments have engaged in a myriad of costly programs to expand Internet capacity
under the belief that this will promote growth.1 Consistent data would make it eas-
ier to assess the relative efficacy of these programs. More importantly, it could shed
light on what economic benefits the Internet brings and to whom. Second, a reli-
able measure of the Internet would help academics across multiple disciplines gain
a better idea of the social and politial impact of this near-ubiquitous technology.
The Internet has been credited with a wide variety of phenomena: revolutions in the
Middle-East,2 increased political polarization,3 the life of political campaigns4 and
1Malaysia, for example, created the Multimedia Super Corridor, which includes a new city, Cy-
berjaya, geared towards ICT companies and their employees.
2See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_Revolution.
3See comments by Eric Schmidt of Google at bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/googles-chief-
on-the-web-and-political-polarization/
4According to Arianna Huffington Obama would not have won the 2008 elections without the
help of the Internet. See techcrunch.com/2008/11/07/the-internet-as-a-force-in-politics-obama-
would-not-have-won-without-the-internet/.
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also their death,5 a powerful tool for monitoring corruption,6 even increased sexual
violence (Bhuller, Havnes, Leuven, and Mogstad, 2011). However, research thus far
has been hampered by a lack of a consistent measure of the Internet or how it is
used.
In this paper, I propose a novel method of measuring Internet penetration that can
be applied to almost any country. I use data from the MaxMind IP geolocation
service, which maps IP addresses to physical locations. I propose four measures to
take account of the fact that IP addresses can change geographical location over
time. Because the data is only available at the city level, I assess an additional
three methods for smoothing the data such that it produce estimates for all areas
in a country.
I test these measures using a government survey on the fraction of households with
Internet connections. I find that the strongest measure (1) takes the sum of the
number of times IP addresses are assigned to each location over a year long period
and (2) uses Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) Interpolation to smooth point data
into a measure for each location in the country. The optimal measure is strong, with
a .63 correlation with survey data.
A network of networks, the Internet is difficult to measure due to its diffuse nature.
Supra-national with no central governing authority, the Internet is a patchwork of
interlocking networks varying in size, type of ownership, and speed, spanning whole
continents, and tied together by a web of underwater cabling hundreds of thousands
of kilometers in length. If assembling information from so many disparate sources
weren’t enough of a challenge, the commercial sensitivity of information on usage
and infrastructure makes Internet Service Providers (ISPs) loathe to release this
data.
Due to the Internet’s complexity, there are many different aspects that can be mea-
sured. First there is the physical infrastructure: the mass of copper, fiber, routers,
switches, towers, data centers that keep the Internet running. Next there is the mass
of information flowing through the network, the nodes through which it travels, the
way the data is routed and the paths taken.7 Finally there is the question of avail-
5Senator George Allen’s loss to Democrat challenger James Webb has been attributed
to the video of Allen uttering a racial slur, which was uploaded to YouTube. See
www.surveyusa.com/client/PollReport.aspx?g=a99a9b7d-89aa-4e5f-9a0e-35d657ae1db3.
6See www.ipaidabribe.com
7In the field of Web Science, organizations like the Cooperative Association for Internet Data
Analysis (CAIDA) actively collect data on the topology of the Internet.
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ability to consumers and business and to what extent this availability translates into
usage.
Some countries and private companies8 have started collecting survey and census
data on Internet usage. However, it is difficult to quantify Internet usage even in
this case. Many early surveys only count home Internet subscriptions, ignoring the
many people who access the Internet from diverse locations such as the workplace,
Internet cafes, and mobile phones.
Due to a lack of official survey data, researchers have turned to a number of alternate
methods. Kolko (2010) uses the number of high speed ISPs registered in a zip code
as a proxy for broadband availability, finding a significant, non-linear relationship
between the number of high speed ISPs registered in a U.S. zip code and broadband
adoption. Hu and Prieger (2008) use DSL availability at the central office/wire-
center level as reported by Ameritech at the time of a merger with SBC in 1999.
However, in both cases this data is only available for the United States. This is the
first paper to employ a measure that can be used in most countries in the world,
and the first to employ IP geolocation data as a proxy for Internet usage.
Much work has been performed by computer scientists to map out the network
topology of the Internet. Danesh, Trajkovic, Rubin, and Smith (1999) provide a
survey of some of the earlier attempts relying on traceroute utility, which returns all
of the nodes that a packet passes through on the way to a destination. Faloutsos,
Faloutsos, and Faloutsos (1999) consider how networks and ISPs connect at the
more aggregate Autonomous System (AS) level. Heidemann, Pradkin, Govindan,
Papadopoulos, Bartlett, and Bannister (2008) perform an Internet census, probing
every visible host on the Internet. Although these studies have greatly improved
our understanding of the network topology of the Internet—namely, the flow of data
between computers, routers, and networks—they do not provide much information
on the physical location of Internet users.
Currently, the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) has
combined these and other techniques to get the most complete picture of the Inter-
net. Fomenkov and Claffy (2011) outlines the various tools at their disposal. Under
the auspices of CAIDA, Huffaker, Fomenkov, and Claffy (2011) analyzes the accu-
racy of IP geolocation databases in operation today. They find that the database
used in this paper, MaxMind GeoIP, is one of the better performers, especially for
8Such as Forrester.
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Asian addresses.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 3.3, I introduce the concept of the IP ad-
dress before explicating the data used in this analysis. I then move on to section 1.3,
where I present my methodology for measuring Internet usage with IP geolocation
data. Section 1.4 shows the result, and section 1.5 checks robustness. In section 3.5,
I conclude.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Data Sources
In order to properly explain the data sources, it is necessary to give a brief definition
of IP addresses. An Internet Protocol address (IP address) is a number that is
assigned to every device that connects to the Internet, ranging from servers to
personal computers to mobile phones. There are two types of IP addresses: IPv4,
the only type of IP address up until 1995, and IPv6, which was developed to address
the problem of the depletion of available IPv4 addresses. This paper focuses solely
on IPv4 addresses, as IPv6 addresses were few and unused during the period of
analysis. In addition to there being two types of IP addresses, there are also two
ways of assigning IP addresses: statically and dynamically. Dynamic IP addresses
are reassigned to multiple devices over time, whereas static IP addresses remain
attached to the same device. The majority of IP addresses are dynamically assigned.
As we will see below, this leads to significant geographic movement in the dataset,
introducing measurement error.
GeoIP database The MaxMind GeoIP City database forms the core of my Internet
measure. GeoIP City is a service that matches IP addresses to geographic locations,
allowing web services to tailor advertisements based on visitor location and to detect
fraud. The GeoIP City database comprises monthly data from 2005 to the present
and covers virtually all IP addresses in the world.9 For each IP address, the GeoIP
City database provides the name and location of the nearest large city on a monthly
basis.
9MaxMind does not cover IPv6 addresses. However, IPv6 adoption was infinitesimal in Malaysia
at the time.
10
1.2 Data
MaxMind’s technique for matching IP addresses to physical locations is proprietary,
thus it is not possible to give a full account of their methods. But their technique
likely relies on a mixture of the following three approaches.10 The first approach
involves delay-based methods, where information on the delay11 from a collection of
IP addresses with known geographic location is used to triangulate the location of IP
addresses without known locations. The second approach relies on database-driven
methods: a map of all static IP addresses is amassed using information from public
and private datasets. The final approach involves topology-driven methods: areas
that are close to each other in terms of the Internet’s topology will also be close to
each other physically.
APNIC database The second source of data comes from the Asia Pacific Infor-
mation Centre (APNIC). APNIC is one of five regional Internet registries in charge
of distributing and managing IP addresses. They release historical data going back
to 2001, updated monthly, which gives a complete list of which IP addresses were
allocated to what companies, and on what date.12 As we shall see below, this in-
formation is valuable because large chunks of IP addresses are often assigned to
companies, who use them for a number of purposes unrelated to connecting users
to the Internet.
Census measure I use official Internet measures from the Population and Housing
Census 2000 and the Household Basic Amenities and Income Survey (HBAIS) for
2004. Both datasets provide the fraction of households with Internet subscriptions
at the mukim (census district) level. As explained in Section 1.2.1, I use ArcGIS to
aggregate the HBAIC data to the legislative district level, which introduces some
measurement error.
Demographics and geography I have complete geospatial data for Malaysia. Fig-
ure 1.1 illustrates clutter data (which classifies all land as either urban, semi-urban,
plantation, jungle, inland water, or open) and elevation data (which allows for the
calculation of land-gradients). Figure 1.2 shows the locations of all major roads,
10For a more thorough description of these techniques, see Huffaker, Fomenkov, and Claffy (2011)
11Delay can be thought of as the amount of time it takes a data packet to travel to the host
computer performing the analysis.
12See http://ftp.apnic.net/apnic/stats/apnic/.
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highways, and railways in Malaysia. Finally, figure 1.3 represents data from the
LandScan service, which estimates population distribution at one square kilometer
resolution through a combination of census data and satellite imagery.13
State legislature districts, on average, are 21% urban and 50% farmland (rural),
with the remaining 29% classified as jungle. Although jungle covers large swaths of
the country, the fairly extensive road network spans more than 80,000 kilometers of
roads as of 2007.
I have constructed a dataset of controls using the Population and Housing Census
of Malaysia for 2000; Malaysia’s Household Basic Amenities and Income Survey for
2004; and geographically disaggregated measures of GDP per capita 2005, generated
by the consultancy Booz & Company. Unless otherwise stated, this data is available
at the level of Malaysia’s 927 census districts, called mukim.
Figure 1.4 shows mukim boundaries alongside state legislative district boundaries.
As can be seen, mukim level data does not match up perfectly with state legislative
districts. To address this discrepancy, I use the LandScan population data to assign
a weight to each one kilometer cell within each mukim. State electoral district values
are generated from the weighted sum of these one square kilometer cells.
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic society. Ethnic Chinese, the wealthiest group in Malaysia,
comprise 26% of the population. Indians currently comprise roughly 8% of the
population. The remainder (65% percent) is largely Malay, except for several ethnic
groups on Borneo and a few small tribes.
1.2.2 Evaluating Data Sources
Dynamic IP Addresses and Measurement Error The accuracy of data and level
of geographic disaggregation varies from country to country. A major reason for
this is that most IP addresses are dynamically assigned. When an IP address is
dynamically assigned a device may keep the same IP address for days or even weeks,
but the number will eventually change. Often the device will simply be reassigned
to a random IP address from the same general area, but in some cases the new IP
address could have previously been assigned to a device in a completely different
region.
13See <http://www.ornl.gov/sci/landscan/> for details on the construction of this dataset.
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Table 1.1, shows the extent to which this is a factor in the dataset. In this table,
I take the average of the GeoIP data for the twelve months of 2005. The Internet
survey that I will later use to evaluate my measure was conducted in 2004. In order
to deal with this issue, I drop all IP addresses from the sample that were assigned
after the date of the survey.14 I accomplish this task by augmenting the sample with
the data from APNIC, which provides the date that the IP address was assigned
and the company that managed the IP address.15 The first row of Panel A shows
that 27% of IP addresses were assigned after the date of the survey.
Another issue with the dataset is that a substantial number of IP addresses are
never assigned to a geographic region. One reason for this is that a substantial
fraction of IP addresses are not used by consumers to access the Internet. For
example, Petronas, Malaysia’s national oil and gas company, controls half a million
IP addresses, but only employs 40,000 people. Webhosting platforms, like Blogger,
also control a large amount of IP addresses, which are used for webpages rather than
to allow a device to connect to the Internet. We can see this phenomenon in Panel
A: the second row shows that out of the IP addresses assigned up to 2004, almost a
quarter of them have not been matched to any location over the entire period; the
third row shows that if we limit the sample to ISPs that actually serve consumers,
only 10% of the addresses are never matched to a geographic location.
Since IP addresses are dynamic, it is possible for them to be unmatched one month
and then matched the next. The first column of Panel B shows the fraction of IPs
that are unmatched to a geographic location and for how many months. 39% of
IP addresses are unmatched to a geographic location for at least one month, but
this drops off heavily to 6% unassigned for two months, and less than .2% for three
months. Figure 1.5 shows the fraction of IP addresses that are unmatched by month.
As can be seen, the fraction of IP addresses unmatched is between 30% and 40%
during the first half of the year, but drops to below 10% during the second half.
Thus another aspect of the dataset is that the geographic precision is increasing
with time.
Discussions with engineers at Malaysia’s ISPs suggest that there is a large bias in
the data towards large cities, in particular Kuala Lumpur. We can see evidence for
this assertion in the fourth row of Panel A, which shows that 23% of IP addresses are
14Results are similar if these IPs are included.
15Not all regional registries provide this information. However, MaxMind provides some of the
same information in its other products.
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matched with Kuala Lumpur and remain fixed to Kuala Lumpur during the entire
twelve month period. Moreover, of the IP addresses that shift location, the second
column of panel B indicates that an additional 25% of IP addresses were assigned
to Kuala Lumpur once, and 7% were assigned twice. Since Kuala Lumpur only
makes up 6% of the population, it is unlikely that this discrepancy can be entirely
explained by increased Internet uptake in Kuala Lumpur.
Panel C shows how much IP addresses change location in practice. In the first row,
we see that the average IP address changes locations around 2.4 times during the
sample. The average amount of time an IP spends attached to any location is around
6 months. Breaking this number down somewhat, in the third row I find that the
average time spent at the location that is held the longest by an IP address is eight
months. This implies that on average IP addresses spend the majority of their time
allocated to one location.
As IP addresses are always being added to a country’s IP space, there’s a possibility
of bias due to some IP addresses only appearing later in the year. The row of Panel
C implies that this is less of a worry as it implies that the average IP address appears
in 11.6 months. The problem of constant assignment over the year is more likely
reflected in the numbers of IP addresses either missing or assigned to Kuala Lumpur.
These IP addresses are likely to recently have been acquired by an ISP, but not yet
allocated to a more permanent location.
One last possible source of error comes from the diminishing number of IPv4 num-
bers. Because there is a scarcity of IPv4 numbers and in 2004 IPv6 was hardly used,
IPv4 numbers were rationed. One way to address this problem is to place an entire
network behind a single IP address. However, IPv4 depletion was a long way off in
2004 and there is little evidence that this type of behavior was occurring on a large
scale.
Geographic Matching and Measurement Error Figure 1.1 shows how the 647
cities matched to IP addresses in Malaysia are distributed spatially. As can be
seen, the cities are concentrated on the coasts, where the majority of the population
resides. Importantly, although the data provides the coordinates of the city center,
it does not give any information on the boundaries of the city. Typically a city will
encompass a greater region around it, including suburbs and smaller towns. This
spatial indeterminacy is a potential source of error dependent upon what level of
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geographic disaggregation a measure is sought.
1.3 Method
In the following section I construct a measure of Internet penetration, which I call
IPperV oter to reflect the fact that the measure is at the level of the state legislature
district level. Before proceeding any further, it is helpful to quickly summarize the
challenges facing this measure due to data limitations.
The two primary sources of measurement error are as follows:
1. Change in IP block location over time: For reasons discussed in Section 1.2.1,
the locations to which IP addresses are assigned change over time. The
monthly data is very noisy with smaller cities disappearing and reappear-
ing from month to month. Moreover, larger cities tend to be overcounted,
especially Kuala Lumpur.
2. Geographical Measurement error: The dataset only provides the coordinates
for the city center; it does not specify the city’s limits. Thus, an IP address
corresponding to a computer in a small town outside a city (and in a different
electoral district) may be incorrectly attributed to the city, introducing fur-
ther bias toward large cities. Furthermore, since only point data is available,
the boundaries between cities are unclear. This can most easily be seen in
figure 1.1, which presents GeoIP city center data alongside legislative district
boundaries. As can be seen, the point locations often appear on the border be-
tween two districts, complicating the task of divvying up IP addresses between
adjacent districts.
In Section 1.3.1, I will show how I account for the error introduced by the first of these
problems. Section 1.3.2 will show how the second of these problems is addressed.
Finally, in Section 1.4 the various methods proposed will be tested against official
survey data and the optimal measure will be chosen.
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1.3.1 Accounting for Error from Dynamic IP Allocation
In response to the problem of IP locations changing over time, I test four methods
for assigning IP addresses to cities based on data from a year-long period.
1. IPfix: I limit the sample to IP addresses that never change location over
the twelve month period and divide by twelve. This is the most conservative
measure, yielding the advantage that the IP addresses are almost certainly
assigned to the correct location. The disadvantage is that the majority of the
sample is lost with most remaining IPs assigned to Kuala Lumpur.
2. IPsum: I sum the number of IP addresses assigned to each city over a twelve-
month period. This is the second most conservative measure, making equal
use of all of the information in the dataset. However, it likely leads to over-
counting Kuala Lumpur. For example, there are many cases in which ten or
eleven out of twelve observations occur in a single city, with the remainder
going to Kuala Lumpur.
3. IPmax: I calculate the number of IP addresses assigned to each city for each
month. IPmax is the value from the month with the most IP addresses. This
measure is meant to account for under-counting of smaller cities. The assump-
tion is that, once an area obtains Internet access, it is unlikely to subsequently
have access physically dismantled. If a location does not appear in subsequent
months, this is due to measurement error rather than a subsequent loss of
Internet connectivity.
4. IPavg: Again I calculate the number of IP addresses assigned to each city for
each month. I then take the average across months when the city appears in
the data. This approach is similar to IPmax, but aims to correct for possible
over-counting of small cities by IPMmax.
1.3.2 Accounting for Geographical Measurement Error
I propose three methods for dealing with the second challenge, geographical mea-
surement error.
1. No Smoothing: As a baseline, no smoothing of the data is performed. Regions
containing city points get all IP addresses assigned to them. This is especially
problematic for large cities that are broken up into a number of electoral
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districts. The district that happens to contain the geographic center of the
city will get all the IP addresses and the rest of the districts will get no IP
addresses.
2. Smooth into a 25 Square Kilometer Area: The IP addresses are allocated to
a 25 square-kilometer, circular buffer area around the center of the city as in
figure 1.6. This addresses some of the issue of IP addresses for an entire city
being assigned to a district, but still doesn’t deal with the problem of suburbs
of the city.
3. IDW Interpolation: I smooth the city point-data into a surface covering the
entire area of peninsular Malaysia, using inverse distance weighting (IDW)
interpolation in ArcGIS. IDW interpolation assigns an IP measure to every
point in Malaysia: the value at each interpolated point is a weighted sum of
the values in the N known points, where closer points get higher weighting.
Figure 1.7 shows an example of IDW interpolation: darker areas have higher
numbers of IP addresses.16
1.4 Results
The approach outlined above produces twelve alternate measures of Internet pen-
etration, four for each of the three geographical interpolation methods. Table 1.2
tests the accuracy of these measures showing how well they correlate with the num-
ber of Internet subscriptions per household, which was collected as part of the 2004
Malaysian Household Basic Amenities and Income Survey.
Specification (1) includes all state legislative districts for peninsular Malaysia and for
Kuala Lumpur’s Parliamentary districts.17 It is immediately evident that out of the
three types of geographical interpolation, IDW has the highest level of correlation,
performing nearly twice as well as the best performer among the other two categories.
Looking at figure 1.6, we can see that both the point estimate method and the
buffer method leave a large number of districts without any IP addresses, even
those adjacent to large cities. The IDW method does a better job of smoothing this
information geographically, leading to a stronger measure.
16The process can be altered so that values are not calculated for areas over the sea. Since areas
over the sea are not included in any calculations, this does not alter the results.
17Kuala Lumpur cannot vote in state legislative elections because it was ejected from the state of
Selangor in 1974 and made into a Federal Territory.
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Of the four methods for accounting for error due to dynamic IP allocation, the
worst performer in specification (1) is the fixed estimator. This is the estimator
that only counts IP addresses that are not dynamically reassigned to a new location
over the twelve month period. The value is close to zero for the point estimate and
buffer interpolation techniques, and is negative in the IDW case. This suggests that
dynamically assigned IP addresses form too large a fraction of the IP base to be
ignored.
Of the remaining estimators, IDW IPmax estimate performs the best with a .46
correlation coefficient. Recall that the IPmax estimator is the value from the month
during which a location was assigned the maximum amount of IP addresses. This
was meant to correct for smaller cities being undercounted, as they frequently dis-
appear from the data for a few months at a time. This suggests that there is indeed
a significant bias towards large cities in the data.
As argued above, the large city with the most potential for introducing bias is
Kuala Lumpur. From table 1.1, nearly half of all IP addresses have been assigned
to Kuala Lumpur at least once during the twelve month period even though the
city only accounts for 7% of the population. In order to addresses this concern, in
specification (2) I drop the largest city in Malaysia from the sample, Kuala Lumpur.
The removal of Kuala Lumpur greatly increases every correlation coefficient except
for IDW IPfix. This suggests that Kuala Lumpur was indeed heavily biasing the
measure.
Once Kuala Lumpur has been removed, the top performer is the IDW IPsum es-
timator with .62 correlation coefficient as compared to .53 for IPmax. The IPsum
estimator is simply the summation of the number of IP addresses assigned to a
location over the twelve-month period. The danger with the IPmax estimator is
that it overcounts small areas that are only present in the data for a few months.
The IPsum estimator, however, takes this into account by aggregating all available
information over the twelve-month period.
Given the drastic effects of dropping Kuala Lumpur from the sample, another con-
cern is that the correlations are simply being driven by outliers. Figure 1.8 shows
a linear graph of IDW IPsum estimator against the census data to assess to what
extent outliers may be affecting the results. The figure suggests several large out-
liers as well as a large skew in the distribution to the left. In order to address this
concern, I take the log of all the measures, which will draw in the outlying results.
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Figure 1.9 shows the effect: there is a significant positive slope. Column (3) of table
1.2 gives the result of the log specification: almost all correlation coefficient increase.
Again, IDW IPsum is the top performer by large margin.
In summary, the optimal measure of Internet penetration is IDW IPsum for the
following reasons:
1. IDW interpolation to account for spatial measurement error.
2. Summation of the number of IP addresses assigned to a location over a twelve
month interval to deal with measurement error from dynamically assigned IP
addresses.
3. Take log to deal with outliers and skew in distribution.
4. Drop outliers that are heavily biasing results. In the case of Malaysia, Kuala
Lumpur was introducing a huge amount of error: dropping the twelve obser-
vations corresponding to Kuala Lumpur increased the correlation of the top
performing estimator by almost a third.
From here on, I will refer to the IDW IPsum measure in logs as IPperPerson.
1.4.1 Measurement error
The IDW IPsum estimator at .62 correlation, indicates a strong correlation, but still
leaves a large, unexplained difference between the two measures.
There are several explanations for why this difference occurs. First, since the HBAIS
data only counts households with Internet subscriptions, it most likely underesti-
mates the percentage of households with access to the Internet by omitting people
who access the Internet at work or in Internet cafes. IPperPerson should capture IP
addresses tied to work and to Internet cafes. However, since IPperPerson contains
no metric for intensity of usage, it would not take into account that hundreds of
individuals might use the same IP address on any given day.
The other most likely reason for imperfect correlation is measurement error. This
error could take the form of bias toward major cities, first because of the nature
of the GeoIP database, which only counts city centers, and second because of the
IDW interpolation technique, which treats the centers of major cities as peaks,
with connectivity decreasing as we move outward. Thus one possibility is that
IPperPerson is proxying for urbanization. I address this concern in the next section.
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1.5 Robustness
In this section I test the extent to which IPperPerson is a good proxy for Internet
penetration. Column (1) of table 1.3 presents a regression of fraction of households
with Internet subscriptions on IPperPerson. As expected, the coefficient is large and
highly significant.
A first concern is that the relationship between IPperPerson and Internet penetra-
tion is non-linear. However, specification (2) suggests that a quadratic relationship
does not fit the data. This can also be seen in figure 1.9, where the quadratic fit is
hardly different from the linear fit.
A second concern is that IP per person is picking up the effects of urbanization:
all the geographic locations are large towns, and large urban areas are more likely
to have large amounts of IP addresses. I test for this possibility in column (3)
where I include controls for population density, road density, distance from the
centroid of the district to the nearest major road, percent of the district that is
urban vs. rural vs. jungle, and the ruggedness of the district, which I calculate
as the standard deviation of the slope. The results suggest that IPperPerson is
not simply proxying for urbanization: the coefficient on IPperPerson diminishes
somewhat from column (1), but remains large and highly significant. As expected,
population density explains some variation in Internet access. Distance to the major
roads also has much explanatory power. This is likely because much of Malaysia’s
fiber-optic infrastructure runs along its major roads.
A third concern is that IPperPerson is proxying for wealth. Wealthier areas could
have more companies using IP addresses for commercial purposes unrelated to the
provision of Internet access (e.g. web hosting). As we can see in specification (4),
the result is hardly changed by the inclusion of GDP per capita as a control.
A final concern with IPperPerson is that it is simply picking up overall engagement
with electronic equipment such as phones, televisions, radios and computers. In
column (5) we see that the coefficient of interest still retains a large amount of its
explanatory power with the inclusion of these controls.
More importantly, this explanatory power is maintained even when a fraction of the
population with computers and fixed lines are included. I interpret this to be the
case because not all people with computers and fixed lines have Internet connections.
Still, computer ownership has substantial explanatory power across specifications.
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Could this be a better proxy than IPperPerson? The problem is that information
on computer ownership is just as hard to find as information on Internet usage.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper shows how the number of IP addresses per person is a good proxy for
Internet penetration. In order to assemble a strong measure a number of steps had
to be taken. First, in order to deal with dynamically allocated IP addresses, the
number of IP addresses assigned to a particular region should be aggregated over
a year period. Second, because only the coordinates of the middle of a city are
given, IDW interpolation helps to smooth the data spatially so that analysis can be
performed at a regional level that doesn’t correspond to the city level.
The measure was then tested to see whether it might be proxying for urbanization,
wealth, or technological development and was found robust to all specifications.
There are many advantages to using the number of IP addresses per person as
a measure of Internet penetration. First, it is the first measure that provides a
consistent measure of Internet use at a sub-country level. Second the data has
been collected for almost every country in the world using the same methodology,
making it comparable across countries. For some countries, the data is far more
comprehensive. In the U.S., for example, IP data is available at the zip code level,
obviating the need for IDW interpolation. Similar levels of detail hold for wealthy
European and East Asian countries.
This data can be used to understand a wide variety of phenomena. Miner (2012), for
example, uses IP data to evaluate the effects of the Internet on elections in Malaysia.
This IP measure can also be used to evaluate the impact on factors like GDP growth,
firm productivity, and labor productivity, all of which are prime concerns for policy
makers.
21
Chapter 1 Measuring Internet Diffusion from IP Addresses
1.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1: Geographic Placement of GeoIP Data
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Figure 1.2: Peninsular Malaysia’s Road and Railway Network
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Figure 1.3: Population Distribution
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Figure 1.4: Legislative District vs. Census District Boundaries
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TABLE 1.1
Measurement error in IP assignment
Panel A: IP Addresses Always Misassigned
Assigned after 2004 (Pct) 27.19
Never assigned location (Pct) 23.69
Consumer ISP never assigned location 9.64
Assigned to Kuala Lumpur (Pct) 23.06
Panel B: IP addresses occasionally misassigned
No Location Kuala Lumpur
Assigned one month (Pct) 38.54 25.14
Reassigned two months (Pct) 5.53 7.76
Reassigned three months (Pct) 0.17 0.55
Panel C: Reallocation of IP addresses over time
Mean Standard Deviation N
Number of times IP changes location 2.404648 1.354786 1476673
Mean months IP in same place 6.345744 3.720512 1476673
Maximum months IP in same place 8.446008 2.998054 1476673
Minimum months IP in same place 4.951242 4.649864 1476673
Months IP appears in data 11.62275 1.786861 1476673
Notes. The table presents summary statistics on IP address movement within the dataset over a one
year period. Panel A looks at IP addresses that are never assigned to a geographic location. Panel B
looks at IP addresses that occasionally are not assigned to a geographic location. Panel C shows how
IP addresses that are assigned to geographic locations change location over time.
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Figure 1.5: Fraction of Sample Not Assigned to Geographic Location
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Figure 1.6: Interpolation of 25 Square Kilometer Buffer Zone
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Figure 1.7: Interpolation: Inverse Distance Weighting Interpolation
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TABLE 1.2
Evaluation of Internet penetration measures
% Households with Internet 2004
(1) (2) (3)
Point estimate IPsum .0918617 .22665753 .29286847
Point estimate IPavg .09090891 .15557172 .19382615
Point estimate IPmax .15075733 .22006066 .26132963
Point estimate IPfix .05274528 .10717812 .11291494
Buffer estimate IPsum .18926857 .21265246 .39235348
Buffer estimate IPavg .17435006 .12764648 .17987505
Buffer estimate IPmax .24318167 .20515007 .28516337
Buffer estimate IPfix .12409332 .12403433 .12790432
IDW estimate IPsum .36036258 .62124655 .63251108
IDW estimate IPavg .31745242 .4920734 .49031368
IDW estimate IPmax .46292961 .53265917 .55639539
IDW estimate IPfix -.05517231 -.13518059 -.14431686
Kuala Lumpur Y N N
N 460 445 445
Notes. Correlation between percentage households with Internet subscription 2004 and self-constructed
Internet penetration measures. Percentage Households with Internet access in 2004 was derived from
Household Basic Amenities Survey 2004. See Section 1.3 for details on the construction and source of
variables.
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Figure 1.8: Linear IPperPerson Against Percent with Household Internet
Figure 1.9: Log IPperPerson Against Percent with Household Internet
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TABLE 1.3
Performance of IP per person with other covariates
% Households with Internet 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log IP per person 30.944*** 21.625** 17.287*** 16.933*** 11.362***
(3.289) (8.597) (3.722) (3.775) (3.652)
Log IP per person SQ 6.775
(6.095)
Population density 4.862*** 4.545*** 1.333**
(0.659) (0.707) (0.631)
% Urban 4.566 4.688 1.599
(6.183) (6.207) (4.946)
% Rural -2.311 -2.026 -2.250
(3.403) (3.439) (2.947)
Road density 3.243 3.233 2.241
(2.467) (2.447) (1.706)
Distance to major road 6.859*** 6.627*** 4.199**
(1.805) (1.835) (1.667)
Ruggedness 0.907*** 0.896*** 0.310
(0.288) (0.285) (0.241)
Log GDP PC 2.868 -1.223
(2.077) (1.801)
Computers 0.646***
(0.065)
Telephones (fixed) 0.155***
(0.058)
Mobile phones -0.207***
(0.039)
Television -0.147
(0.111)
Radio 0.264**
(0.122)
N 433 433 433 433 433
R2 .56 .563 .691 .692 .786
Notes. The table reports the results of regressing percentage of households with an Internet subscription on IPper-
Person. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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1.8 Data appendix
Data Descriptions and Sources
Variable Description Source
Original Variables
Eligible voters Number of people eligible to vote in a district. Election
Commission (1986,
1990, 1995, 1999,
2004, 2008)
Generated Variables
GDP Measure of average GDP per capita at the mukim
(census district) level, generated by the consultancy
Booz & Company. Aggregated up to the state
legislature district level using ArcGIS and
LandScan as outlined in Section 1.2.1.
Booz & Company
(2005)
% Household with
Internet 2004
Fraction of households with an Internet
subscription at the mukim level. Aggregated up to
the state legislature district level using ArcGIS and
LandScan as outlined in Section 1.2.1.
Household Basic
Amenities and
Income Survey
(2004), Population
and Housing
Census (2000)
Ruggedness The standard deviation of the average steepness of
land in a district. Calculated from digital elevation
satellite imagery using ArcGIS first to calculate the
slope at each point and then to derive the average
and standard deviation across a district.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
% Urban rural Percentage of a district that is classified as urban
and rural farm using satellite imagery. The omitted
category is jungle. Used ArcGIS to calculate
percentage at district level.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
Road density Kilometers of road in a district divided by total
area of the district. Calculated using ArcGIS.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
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Population density From Oak Ridge National Laboratory LandScan
product, which uses census data in conjunction
with satellite information to estimate population at
the 1 km resolution. I use ArcGIS to aggregate up
to the district level.
LandScan, Oak
Ridge National
Laboratory (2008)
Km to roads Distance from the centroid of a district to the
closest major road and closest federal road as of
2008. The road data is from Pitney Bowes. ArcGIS
was used to calculate the centroid of each district
and then derive the distance measure.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
IPperPerson The number of IP addresses per eligible voter.
Constructed with ArcGIS from IP geolocation data
from MaxMind in conjunction with records from
APNIC. See Section 1.3 for details.
MaxMind
(2004-2008),
APNIC
(2004-2008)
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2 The Unintended Consequences of
Internet Diffusion: Evidence from
Malaysia
2.1 Introduction
The Internet has grown enormously over the past two decades: from its DARPA
roots in the U.S. Department of Defense, to today where it is a near-ubiquitous
method of communication and information exchange in developed countries and—
thanks to the rise of mobile telephony—a rapidly expanding technology in developing
countries. Since its inception, much has been made of the Internet’s potential as a
democratizing force that frees information from the control of governments, implodes
the distance between users around the world, and provides access to new viewpoints.
Indeed, the Internet’s ability to provide unfiltered access to information has caused
consternation among many governments. This response has been notable in China,
which has invested billions in keeping the Internet under tight rein. Social media
has also been identified as a driving factor behind protests the world over, such
as the recent revolutions across the Middle East. Despite a wealth of anecdotal
evidence, however, little quantitative work has been conducted to test the ability of
the Internet to foster democratization.
Malaysia serves as a particularly compelling test case in this regard. First, the ruling
coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN), enjoyed veto-proof control over all branches
of government from 1969 to 2008. Although Malaysia holds regular democratic
elections, the BN maintained power through strict controls on the judiciary, the
police, and, importantly, the mass media.
Second, the BN’s hold on power was so secure that it initiated an aggressive in-
formation and communications technology (ICT) led development strategy, based
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on an uncensored Internet. The government has invested heavily in the ICT sector
since 1996 as a means to promote growth and enjoys a very high rate of Internet
penetration—60% as of 2008. At the same time, to attract foreign direct investment
(FDI), the government pledged not to censor the Internet.
Third, since the Internet is uncensored, it has become home to a vibrant opposition
blogosphere and a number of popular, independent news sites. In March 2008 the
BN lost its two-thirds majority in parliament for the first time since 1969, as well
as control of 5 out of 13 states. In the aftermath, commentators argued that the
Internet played a leading role in this outcome by providing access to alternative
viewpoints. In the rush to promote an information economy, the government over-
looked the consequences with regard to political control. This paper tests whether
Internet penetration influenced voting behavior in Malaysia, focusing on the 2004
and 2008 elections.
I develop a simple model to understand the mechanism by which the Internet influ-
ences election results. The model, building on Besley and Prat (2006), presents a
retrospective voting framework in which the incumbent decides whether to buy off
the media. This model shows how the Internet can influence electoral outcomes in
regimes that use mass media control to ensure reelection. The key insight is that
the Internet can weaken the ruling party’s hold on power by undermining its ability
to suppress negative information on candidate type. The model’s main prediction
is that areas with relatively higher Internet connectivity will experience lower vote
shares for the incumbent party and higher turnover.
An important contribution of this paper is a novel measure of Internet penetration,
which can be applied to almost any country. For most countries there are no ge-
ographically disaggregated measures of change in Internet access across time. To
address this problem, I use a dataset that maps all of the IP addresses in Malaysia to
approximate geographical locations. I aggregate the data up to the yearly period to
deal with changes in assignment location across months. Next I use inverse-distance
weighting interpolation to convert the data from the city level to the state legislature
district level. Finally, I normalize by the number of eligible voters in a district to
create the final measure. I find that this measure performs well when tested against
census data from 2004.
To address problems of endogenous Internet placement and confounding political
trends, I instrument for Internet growth. I calculate the shortest distance from each
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electoral district to the backbones of Malaysia’s main Internet Service Providers
(ISPs). An increase in distance to the backbone leads to higher costs of supplying
Internet connectivity (e.g., digging new trenches and laying cabling). This provides
exogenous variation in Internet supply across districts. I exploit differences across
ISPs in terms of geographical constraints on the placement of their backbones to
argue that distance to the backbone is unlikely to affect voting outcomes directly,
conditional on covariates. The identifying assumption is that conditional on baseline
district characteristics (ethnic distribution, GDP per capita, population density)
distance to the backbone does not affect change in vote share independently of
growth in Internet access.
Based on the identifying assumption, I show a large, causal effect of Internet growth
on election results: that the Internet can explain about one-third of the 11% drop
in support for the BN from the 2004 to the 2008 election.
I run a number of checks on my identifying assumption. I show that distance to
the backbone is uncorrelated with election swings in the pre-Internet period. By
controlling for distance to roads and road density, I find that these instruments
do not proxy for distance to roads. Lastly, I show that the instruments are not
capturing the effect of distance to railroads: when I drop the backbone that runs
along the railways, the result is unchanged.
Next I examine the effect of Internet growth on the turnover of politicians in the
incumbent party. I show that Internet growth led to increased turnover, if baseline
Internet access is sufficiently high.
Finally, I test to see whether the Internet affected voter turnout. I find that a one
standard deviation increase in Internet growth corresponds to a 1.5% increase in
participation.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to measure the Internet’s ef-
fects on elections. It relates most directly to a large and growing strain of political
economics literature on the complex relationship between media, government, and
voters. From an empirical standpoint, Besley and Burgess (2002) provide evidence
of a positive effect of the mass media on government responsiveness to natural dis-
asters. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) show how a newspaper-based information
campaign on education spending in Uganda improved education outcomes. Snyder
and Strömberg (2010) exploit variation between newspaper markets and congres-
sional districts to identify positive effects of newspapers both on voters’ knowledge
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of their representative and on federal spending in their district. In terms of broad-
cast mediums, Stromberg (2004) finds access to the radio significantly affected public
spending during the New Deal. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) find that the emer-
gence of the conservative Fox News Channel had a large impact on the 2000 U.S.
Presidential elections.
While much has been written about the traditional media, very little empirical
work examines the effect of Internet media. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) look
at the effects of the growth of new media on ideological segregation in the U.S.A.
I believe this paper is the first to provide causally interpretable evidence of the
effect of Internet media on election outcomes and the first paper to concentrate on
a developing country.
In terms of theory, this paper relates to Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), which
finds that increased competition in the media market could lead to increased bias as
newspapers slant their news toward their readerships’ priors, and to Baron (2006),
which ties increased in bias to journalists’ career concerns. This paper draws heavily
from Besley and Prat (2006), which presents a theoretical framework for government
capture of the media and shows how increased competition in the media market can
yield better information on candidate quality and increased turnover. I extend their
model by differentiating between traditional and web-based media. In modeling the
effect of Internet-based media, this paper relates to Edmond (2011), which presents
a model of media and regime change that distinguishes between print and broadcast
media and online social media.
More broadly, this paper relates to literature on the effects of information technology
on development. Jensen (2007) looks at the effects of the introduction of mobile
phones on fish markets in Kerala; Goyal (2010) similarly analyzes the effects of
Internet kiosks on crop prices in Madhya Pradesh; and Jack and Suri (2011) explore
the impact of mobile payment on informal risk sharing.
Finally, this paper’s empirical strategy pertains to literature exploiting geographic
variation for identification. Geography has been used to identify the effects of
dams (Duflo and Pande, 2007); electrification (Dinkelman, 2011; Barham, Lipscomb,
and Mobarak, 2011); social capital (Olken, 2009; Paluck, 2009); ethnic violence
(Yanagizawa-Drott, 2012); and the long-term effects of slavery (Nunn, 2008; Nunn
and Puga, 2012).
I start in section 2.2 by outlining a general theoretical framework to help understand
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the main mechanism at play. Section 2.3, shows how the model pertains to Malaysia,
providing background on politics, media, and the Internet. In section 2.4, I describe
my data sources, before outlining my method for constructing a measure of Internet
penetration. Section 2.5 presents my empirical strategy results. I start by exploring
the strong correlation that exists in the data and then move on to the issue of
causality. In section 2.6, I examine additional outcomes and then conclude in section
2.7.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section I develop a simple model for understanding how the Internet influ-
ences voting outcomes when all conventional sources of information are government-
controlled. The model is based on Besley and Prat (2006), extended to account for
differences between traditional media outlets (e.g., TV, radio, print) and web-based
media outlets. The model shows how increased Internet access can lead to strength-
ened government control over traditional media outlets, but less control over the
general flow of information. This weaker control over information in turn will lead
to diminishing vote share for the incumbent and increased turnover. The model
goes on to show how this equilibrium can hold even when more than half of voters
have access to (uncensored) Internet-based media.
2.2.1 Basic Model
I use a two-period retrospective voting model. In the first period, an incumbent
party is exogenously in power and is of two possible types θ ∈ {g, b} (“good” and
“bad” respectively). A good party will deliver a benefit of one to voters; whereas,
a bad party delivers zero benefit. The incumbent party’s type is realized at the
beginning of time and is good with probability γ.
Voters do not observe their payoffs when deciding to reelect the incumbent party
and must rely on media reporting for information on type. Voters are distributed
in a continuum of districts, which can vary along two dimensions. First, districts
can differ in terms of the fraction of the population with Internet access φj in
district j. Second, districts can differ in terms of population size. ψj represents
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relative population size and is the fraction of total population in each district j.
The incumbent party must win in a majority of districts to retain power.
The media comprises two firms: a mainstream media firm of type M , which we can
think of as encompassing print, television, and radio; and a web-based firm of type
W , which encompasses all Internet-based news sources without oﬄine counterparts.1
This could range from web-based news sites to blogs and Twitter feeds.
A key distinction between the mainstream firm and the web-based firm is that
the mainstream firm can reach all voters; whereas, the web-based firm’s potential
audience is limited to the fraction of voters with Internet access. The mainstream
firm may also have an online presence, but I assume they are more vulnerable
to government capture due to their oﬄine core (I provide a justification for this
assumption in section 2.3.2).
If the incumbent party is good, neither firm observes a signal on quality. If the
incumbent party is bad, firms receive a signal s that θ = b with probability q ∈ [0, 1].
Firms then can report either bad news or no news. As in Besley and Prat (2006), I
assume that only verifiable information can be reported; it is not possible to fabricate
bad news. I also assume that both firms receive the same information.
The media receives two types of payoffs: revenue from consumers and revenue from
government payoffs. If a media firm reports bad news, the total audience-related
revenue available in the market is a. If no news is reported, this revenue is nor-
malized to zero. Viewers prefer informative news. If only the mainstream firm
reports bad news it captures the entire market, earning revenue a and all voters
are informed. If only the web-based firm reports bad news, its payoff is limited by
Internet coverage aΦ and only fraction Φ of voters are informed. If both media
firms report bad news, the mainstream news gets all oﬄine consumers and splits the
Internet-capable audience equally with Internet firms. All voters are informed and
payoffs for mainstream and web firms are a(1− Φ2 ) and aΦ2 respectively.
The incumbent party receives a payoff r for staying in office and can manipulate
the news before the vote in the second period. This is modeled as a bargaining
game between media outlets and the incumbent party. The party can offer non-
negative transfers tM (for the mainstream firm) and tW (for the web firm). If a media
firm accepts the transfer, they agree to suppress their signal and report no news.
However, their payoffs for accepting are limited by transaction costs τi ∈ [1,∞).
1This model can be extended to multiple firms of each type, without modifying the result.
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For any given ti, a firm receives only tiτi . The incumbent’s payoff is r − tM − tW if
reelected and −tM − tW if not.
As noted in Besley and Prat (2006), transfers can take a number of forms, from
all-out bribery to special perks for firms owned by the same company that controls
the media outlet. The transaction costs will differ depending on factors such as
legal institutions and the ownership type. They speculate that transaction costs
should be lowest for state-owned firms and higher for independently owned media.
In the context of Malaysia, history shows that capture is possible for the mainstream
media, but that the web media is too costly to capture.2 For simplicity, I model the
prohibitive cost of capturing the web media with the assumption that the transaction
costs for the web are infinite: τW =∞.3
The model’s timing is as follows. We begin with an incumbent party in office whose
type is realized with probability γ. If the party is of good type, all media outlets
observe no signal. If the party is a bad type, all media firms observe the signal s = b
with probability q and s = ∅ otherwise. The incumbent party observes the signal
that the media firms receive and chooses transfers ti. Each media outlet observes its
transfer and decides whether to accept. If it accepts, it reports s˜i = ∅ and receives
ti
τi
. If it rejects, it reports s˜i = b . Finally, voting is sincere. Each voter observes
media reports and updates the posterior probability that the incumbent is good γˆ.
She votes for the incumbent if γˆ > γ and for the challenger if γˆ < γ .4
2.2.2 Results when all districts are identical
I focus on a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, restricted to pure strategies in which
voters always vote sincerely for the candidate they prefer. I start with the special
case in which all districts are of equal size with identical Internet penetration rates.
First, note that a bad incumbent party will never choose to capture either media
outlet if Φ ≥ 12 , since by assumption τW is too high to capture the web media and
web access is so widespread that a majority of voters will discover the party’s type
and vote them out.
2I provide evidence for this in section 2.3.2.
3τW doesn’t need to be infinite, but rather high enough such that it is never profitable for the
incumbent to capture the web: τW > raΦ .4As in Besley and Prat (2006) sincere voting is assumed for analytical simplicity.
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Proposition 1 Assuming the Internet is too costly to capture (τW =∞) and all
districts are of equal size with identical Internet penetration rates, equilibrium
in the game overall is of two kinds:
1. A bad incumbent party will capture the mainstream media if Φ < 12 and r ≥
τMa
(
1− Φ2
)
, but will not capture the web media. The party will win in all
jurisdictions.
2. Otherwise, a bad incumbent party will not capture either outlet and will be
discovered with probability q.
Proof: see appendix.
To see this, note that since the web firm will never accept, the most that the main-
stream firm can earn by deviating and not accepting the transfer is a(1− Φ2 ) as out-
lined above. Thus, the mainstream firm will accept only if tM ≥ τMa
(
1− Φ2
)
and, by
extension, the bad incumbent will choose to make a transfer only if r ≥ τMa
(
1− Φ2
)
.
A notable implication is that the cost of capturing the mainstream media is actu-
ally decreasing with Φ as long as Φ < 12 , reflecting the fact that the incumbent need
capture only a majority of the market rather than the entire market.
If the mainstream firm accepts, its expected audience-related revenue is zero, instead
of qa
(
1− Φ2
)
in the case in which neither firm is captured. In contrast, the web-
based media’s market share is qaΦ instead of qaΦ2 . The mainstream media loses
viewers to the web-based media.
Turning to voters, if the mainstream outlet is captured, viewers without Internet
access will receive no information on candidate quality and will reelect the incum-
bent. If the fraction of voters without Internet is at least one-half, the incumbent
will be reelected with certainty and turnover will be zero. If the mainstream firm is
not captured, a bad incumbent will be discovered with probability q and the signal
will be reported. Turnover, then, is simply the probability that the incumbent is
bad and that the media receives a signal to this effect: q(1− γ)
This yields the following implications.
Proposition 2 Assuming Internet is costly to capture and districts are identical:
1. If Φ < 12 an increase in Internet access leads to
a) Lower voting shares for the incumbent
42
2.2 Theoretical Framework
b) No change in turnover
c) Loss of market share by mainstream media outlets
2. If Φ ≥ 12 an increase in Internet access leads to
a) Lower voting shares for the incumbent
b) Turnover increases from 0 to q(1− γ) across all districts.
Proof: see appendix.
2.2.3 Extension: Internet penetration and population size vary
across districts
In this section I relax the assumption that Internet penetration φ and population
size ψ are identical across districts. I show the sufficient distributional assumptions
needed for the incumbent party to capture the mainstream media and win a majority
of seats even when Internet penetration across the country as a whole is greater than
50%.
First, consider the case in which only Internet penetration φ is allowed to vary and
let its distribution be f(φ). If f(φ) is rightly skewed around φ = 12 , it is possible
to have a greater mass of districts with φ < 12 , but a long right tale leading to
Φ > 12 . Under these conditions, government capture could be sustained with Φ >
1
2 ,
since a majority of districts have Internet penetration rates lower than 50%. The
maximum value of Φ > 12 for which media capture is still optimal, Φ, is increasing
in the rightward skew of f(φ). 5
If ψ (fraction of overall population per district) is allowed to vary as well, an equi-
librium can be sustained where Φ > 12 , the mainstream media is captured and there
is no skew in f(φ). Suppose there is no skew and let φ¯ = 1
N
∑
φi be the average
measure of Internet penetration across districts. In the case in which population
is identical across districts this value is the same as Φ (fraction of the country’s
population with Internet), but once population varies across districts it is possible
for a gap to emerge between these two values δ = Φ− φ¯. δ can be thought of as the
bias on the electoral effect of the Internet due to differences in population across
5Negative skew would lead to the opposite result: mainstream media capture could not be sus-
tained even in a situation where nation-wide penetration rates are less than 50%.
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districts. The sign and size of this gap depends on the joint distribution of φ and
ψ. If Internet penetration and population size are positively correlated, δ will be
positive and increasing in the covariance between φ and ψ.
I call the media “capturable” if any of the above conditions is met, such that the
incumbent can win the election by paying off the mainstream media. This leads to
the following results:
Proposition 3 Suppose Internet penetration, φ, and population, ψ, vary by district,
and Φ ≥ 12 . The equilibrium in the game is of two kinds:
1. A bad incumbent party will capture the mainstream media if: Internet penetra-
tion is rightly skewed around φ = 12 and/or φ and ψ are positively correlated
such that φ < 12 for a majority of districts but Φ ≥ 12 . The party will win in
all jurisdictions where φ < 12 and will retain a majority. The incumbent party
will be discovered with probability q in districts where φ ≥ 12 .
2. Otherwise, the incumbent party will not capture either outlet and will be dis-
covered with probability q.
Proof: see appendix.
In section 2.4.3, I show that the distribution of Internet in Malaysia is rightward
skewed and Internet access is higher in districts with higher fractions of the total
population. This suggests the incumbent party can win elections by capturing the
media even when Internet access is greater than 50% across the country as a whole.
To summarize, the model’s main empirical prediction is that an increase in Internet
access will cause a decrease in the incumbent party’s vote share, in the presence of
media capture. Intuitively, the Internet allows voters to circumvent media controls,
and thus enables them to receive negative signals on candidate quality. The incum-
bent party’s vote share will shrink as an increasing fraction of the population gains
access to negative signals. I test this prediction in detail in section 2.5.
A secondary implication of the model is that Internet growth will yield higher
turnover in districts where access is above the 50% threshold, but have no effect
in districts with low levels of Internet access. Section 2.6 finds evidence corroborat-
ing this prediction.
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2.3 Background
In this section I relate Malaysia to the theoretical framework above. I start by
outlining Malaysia’s political regime, move on to describe the state of the country’s
media sector, and finish with a discussion of its Internet.
2.3.1 Political regime
The model above provides a useful framework for thinking about the Internet’s
effect in Malaysia. Classified variously as “partly free”6, a “flawed democracy”7,
and a “pseudo-democracy”8, Malaysia’s political regime combines democratic and
autocratic elements.
Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states with a parliamentary system of governance.
Elections are first-past-the-post and occur for both the national parliament and each
state legislature. Since independence, Malaysia has been ruled by the same coalition
in various guises, the Barisan Nasional (BN, or the Alliance prior to 1969). Though
the BN includes parties representing minorities, most notably the Malaysian Chinese
Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), it is effectively run by
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). The UMNO represents Malay
and other “native” ethnic groups, known collectively as Bumiputera (meaning sons
of the soil).
As in the model in section 2.2, the incumbent coalition has captured the print and
broadcast media. Media ownership is concentrated in a handful of conglomerates
that are controlled by the government, constituent members of the BN, and closely
connected businessmen. For example, UMNO founded and controls the Utusan
Group, which includes the Utusan Melayu, the oldest and most widely distributed
Malay daily. Also, Media Prima, the largest media conglomerate in Malaysia, owns
the largest English daily, two of the largest Malay dailies, four television channels,
and three radio stations, and is itself controlled by business proxies of UMNO.9
Although the traditional media show some variation in their level of bias, in general
6See Freedom House: <www.freedomhouse.org>
7See Economist Intelligence Unit: <www.eiu.com>
8See Case (2001)
9See Abbott (2011) for a more detailed discussion of the ownership structure of the media.
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they tend to under-report on opposition candidates and downplay scandals.10
In addition, strict legal restrictions on media outlets prevent the emergence of any
mainstream outlet that is overly critical of the government. First, media firms can
only operate with a permit and face tightly controlled distribution. Opposition
parties are denied permits to publish newspapers, even though constituent members
of the BN control multiple media outlets. In the past, publications with critical
views of the BN have quickly lost their operating permits and have either shut
down or changed ownership.11 Second, laws such as the Sedition Act, the Control
of Imported Publications Act, and the Official Secrets Act allow the government to
censor material with impunity.12 Finally, the Internal Security Act, enacted in 1960
to fight a Communist insurgency, allows detention without trial for up to two years
and can be renewed indefinitely.13
As in the model, population sizes vary greatly across districts. Apart from media
control, the BN has effectively used redistricting as a means to maintain power. This
trend, evident across the country at both the state and the parliamentary levels,
tends to grossly over-represent rural areas at the expense of cities. Many rural
areas act as “vote banks” for the BN, where allegations of vote-buying abound.14
The period between 1986 and 2008 alone saw three redelineation exercises, with
parliamentary seats rising from 177 to 222 and state legislature seats (excluding
Sabah and Sarawak) rising from 351 to 455.
Malaysia has had opposition parties since independence, but only in recent years
have they posed a real threat to the BN’s hegemony. The rise of a viable opposition
can be traced to the late-1990s, when a split between then-Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim led to Anwar’s sacking and
subsequent imprisonment under charges of sodomy and corruption. Anwar, once
ejected from government, founded an opposition movement called Reformasi. After
his imprisonment, the movement coalesced into a political party and, following a
name change and a merger, is now known as the PKR (People’s Justice Party). The
other members of the opposition are the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a secular
10See Centre for Independent Journalism Malaysia (2008) or
<www.malaysiakini.com/news/168567> for specific examples.
11See Kua (1990) for examples.
12For example, the Home Ministry censored an article in the July 16th, 2011 issue of the Economist
on an electoral reform rally.
13As of September 2011, an announcement was made to reform these laws. See section 2.3.2 for
details.
14See Pepinsky (2007)
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party backed mainly by Malaysian Chinese, and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
(PAS), an Islamist party supported largely by Malays in the north of peninsular
Malaysia. The PKR, DAP, and PAS contested the 1999 and 2004 elections as part
of the Barisan Alternatif (BA), but disbanded the coalition after dismal losses in
2004.
Their fortunes changed dramatically in 2008. The parties wrested control of 5 out
of 13 state houses and deprived the BN of its two-thirds majority in parliament. As
we shall see below, there is good reason to believe that the Internet played a role in
this outcome.
2.3.2 The Internet and politics
The second essential parallel to the model lies in Malaysia’s treatment of the In-
ternet. In stark contrast to print, radio, and television, the Internet has never
experienced significant censorship.
By 2008, Malaysia had a very high rate of Internet access. Internet users com-
prised 56% of the population, compared to 24% in Thailand and 75% in Japan.15
Malaysia’s high Internet penetration rate stems from Mahathir’s decision, in 1996, to
invest heavily in ICT infrastructure as a way to foster a knowledge-based economy.
At the forefront of this effort was the creation of the Multimedia Super Corridor
(MSC), a high-tech zone south of Kuala Lumpur. This project entailed large-scale
investment in constructing a brand-new “high tech” city called Cyberjaya and two
new universities. It formed part of the MSC’s primary goal: to attract multina-
tional companies through tax breaks and first-class infrastructure. Most important,
to make the location more attractive to FDI, the government signed an Internet
“bill of rights”, pledging not to censor the Internet.16
As a result, the Internet is the only platform available for alternate view points
and has become an important source for independent news and opposition news
and views. As early as 1999, members of the pro-Anwar Reformasi movement used
blogs and newsgroups to spread their message, and there is some evidence that the
Internet influenced the 1999 general elections.17 Although Reformasi sites ebbed
in subsequent years, the opposition continued to dominate the web as opposition
15See World Bank Development Indicators: <data.worldbank.org>
16See MSC Malaysia Bill of Guarantees at <www.mscmalaysia.my.
17See Zinnbauer (2003)
47
Chapter 2 The Unintended Consequences of Internet Diffusion
lawmakers joined citizen bloggers to try to reach a wider audience. The Harakah
Daily, a PAS-owned news portal, represents the most ambitious online effort by an
opposition party; it effectively allows the PAS to distribute a newspaper without
obtaining a permit. In addition, a number of independent online news sites, the
most famous being Malaysiakini, tend to favor the opposition. Finally, services such
as YouTube, and increasingly Twitter, have made it easy to spread the word about
political scandals and protest movements.
In terms of the model, which requires that information be verifiable, the Internet’s
most salient feature is its ability to provide information about scandals that pre-
viously would have been suppressed. The best example, the V.K. Lingam video
uploaded to YouTube in late-2007, showed high-level officials engaged in judicial
fixing for the Supreme Court. The video received millions of hits in a matter of
days and erupted into one of the defining issues of the 2008 elections. In line with
the model’s predictions of effects on the media market, evidence suggests that the
popularity of the captured media declined. According to a 2010 survey by the
Merdeka Center, an independent polling organization, only 40% of Malaysians trust
the mainstream media, down 20% from a similar poll conducted two years earlier.18
An important assumption in the model is that the Internet is too costly to capture.
This assumption holds true in Malaysia for a number of reasons. From a purely
economic standpoint, censorship scares away the FDI needed for Malaysia’s ICT-
based growth strategy: as user data migrates from the desktop to servers in the
cloud, multinationals are loath to expose themselves to governments that try to
limit how they can use this data.19
The Internet is also physically more difficult to regulate than other forms of media.
In Malaysia, most opposition content is hosted on international platforms such as
Google (Blogger and YouTube), Twitter, and Facebook. As Google’s exit from
China and all platforms’ response to the Arab Spring convey, these platforms tend
to dislike engaging in self-censorship. As a result, even if independent news sites were
shut down, users could still access content hosted abroad and add to it by posting
anonymously. Efforts could be made to censor the Internet, as in China’s “Great
Firewall”, but they would be prohibitively expensive and ultimately ineffectual. In
18See <www.merdeka.org>
19For example, Blackberry maker RIM, has fought against attempts
by various governments to access their encrypted network. See
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704017904575409093226146722.html>
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terms of expense, such censorship would require substantial investment in not only
physical capital but also human capital.20 Internet censoring would also prove futile;
it is always possible for users to leak information,21 browse anonymously,22 or bypass
firewalls—even ones as sophisticated as China’s.23
There are signs that the inherent difficulty in controlling the Internet is starting
to have an effect on government policy. In a speech delivered in August 2011,
the current prime minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, stated: “In today’s borderless,
interconnected world, censoring newspapers and magazines is increasingly outdated,
ineffective and unjustifiable.”24 In September 2011, he went on to announce plans
to reform Malaysia’s media laws and repeal the Internal Security Act, which allows
for detention without trial. It remains unclear if this announcement will translate
into meaningful reforms.
2.3.3 Internet placement
Official sources state that the primary motives for building ICT infrastructure were,
first, to help Malaysia attain the status of a developed nation25 and, second, to
help promote a Bumiputera business class.26 In practice, only the first of these
goals seems to have played a serious role, with geographical costs being equally
important.
The current state of Malaysia’s ICT infrastructure originated in efforts to liberalize
the telecommunications sector in the early-1990s. The government listed the public
telecom, Telekom Malaysia (TM), on the local stock exchange (and retained ma-
jority ownership); it issued licenses for private telecoms; and it established a new,
independent regulator. The liberalization process was poorly planned, with a large
number of licenses issued in a very short period to well-connected businessmen.
Hungry for profits, but lacking experience in the ICT sector, these private operators
20China has an army of Internet police whose sole job is to peruse fo-
rums, blogs, search results, etc. for objectionable content. See
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2005/jun/14/newmedia.china>
21Either by posting anonymously to services like YouTube, or to organizations like Wikileaks.
22Tor is the best known program for anonymous browsing. See <http://www.torproject.org/>
23Ultrasurf, for example, allows users within China to circumvent Internet filtering by routing
their connection through proxy servers.
24See <http://www.economist.com/node/21526885>
25First seen as early as 1991 in Mahathir’s Vision 2020 development policy.
26This is laid out as an explicit aim in the National Telecommunications Plan, 1994.
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went on an uncoordinated infrastructure building spree. Mass bankruptcies ensued
in the 1997 Asian financial crisis.27
The country emerged from the crisis with a high but uneven level of connectivity:
redundant infrastructure in some areas, and a lack of basic telephony services in oth-
ers. To address infrastructure redundancy, the government encouraged consolidation
and infrastructure-sharing. Figure 2.7 gives an idea of the state of Malaysia’s Inter-
net infrastructure from 2000 onward, showing the three largest Internet backbones
currently in operation:28
1. Telekom Malaysia (TM): TM, the state-owned incumbent, has the most cov-
erage and capacity. It accounts for just over half of all private Internet connec-
tions between 2004 and 2008.29 TM also sells capacity to ISPs that lack ex-
tensive physical infrastructure. These ISPs complain, however, that the rates
that TM charges are too high for them to compete with TM’s own services, es-
pecially in areas that are not served by other backbones.30 Interviews suggest
a mixed view of government involvement in TM’s placement decisions. On the
one hand, the government expects TM to perform the bulk of the heavy lifting
to bring infrastructure to remote areas. On the other hand, in the wake of
costly bankruptcies after the Asian financial crisis, the government has placed
increased emphasis on TM turning a profit. Interviews with planning engineers
suggest that demand and geography were the primary factors in infrastructure
development since 2000.
2. Time dotCom (Time): Time, a private company, has its own ISP geared to-
ward consumers and businesses. Like TM, it sells excess capacity to ISPs that
lack physical infrastructure. As shown in the figure, Time covers less area
than TM and overlaps almost completely with TM’s network. The red points
in figure 2.7 are landing stations connected by submarine cabling, which pro-
vide network redundancy. There is no evidence of government involvement
in Time’s placement decisions. If anything, Time went against government
wishes by over-investing in redundant infrastructure. As a result, the govern-
27For a complete analysis of the liberalization of Malaysia’s telecom sector see Salazar (2007)
chapter 7.
28Malay’s fourth major backbone, Fibrecomm, runs along Malaysia’s major power lines. However,
this could not be included due to a lack of reliable GIS data.
29Budde 2009, Malaysia Internet Services.
30In fact, the governmental authority in charge of policing the ICT industry has found TM guilty
of anti-competitive behavior, but has yet to take any action. See MCMC 2005.
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ment had to rescue Time from bankruptcy after the financial crisis (when the
current outlines of its present network were already set).
3. Fiberail: Fiberail’s ownership is split between TM and Malaysia’s public rail-
way service. As the name suggests, Fiberail’s backbone runs the length of
Malaysia’s major railways, which were completed in 1931. Given its stake in
Fiberail, TM uses Fiberail’s network extensively. However, Fiberail positions
itself as independent from TM, and sells capacity to ISPs and major corpo-
rations. Founded in 1995, Fiberail’s initial business activities were restricted
geographically to companies with points of presence (access facilities) within
a narrow corridor around the railway. In 2006, its license changed such that
it could operate throughout the country. In February 2006, Fiberail acquired
Petrofibre, a fiber-optic network spanning Malaysia’s main gas pipelines.31 It
was impossible to include this additional information on the map, however, as
reliable GIS data on pipeline locations are not publicly available.
Annual reports, consultant reports, and interviews concur that cost plays a central
role in governing placement, and defining a few key terms will help provide a sense of
those costs. ISP backbone refers to the trunk lines, nodes, and routers that form the
core of an ISP’s network. Linked by bundles of fiber-optic cables, which provide high
speed and capacity, backbones are constantly upgraded and occasionally expanded.
The backbones form only a part of the network that connects a user to the Internet,
however. When a user logs on to the Internet, for example, the signal must first travel
along a length of cable (usually copper), which connects the user’s location to a local
exchange on the edge of the ISP’s network. This first step is often called the local
loop or the last mile. The signal then travels along a backhaul connection (normally
cabling) until it reaches an access point to the ISP’s backbone, called a point of
presence. Depending on the size of the ISP, the signal may need to pass through
several other ISP networks before reaching the Internet. Alternatively, the ISP
itself may be directly connected to the Internet via, for instance, an intercontinental
submarine cable.
The costs of delivering the Internet to consumers can be divided into several cate-
gories. First is the cost of installing the backbone. Geographical and legal factors
are the main impediments to backbone placement. In terms of geography, costs
include digging trenches so that the fiber-optic cabling can be laid underground.
31Budde 2009, Malaysia Telecommunications Infrastructure.
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These trenching costs depend on the terrain: it is much more expensive to lay fiber-
optic through a jungle than alongside a road. All three backbones therefore follow
preexisting routes: roads and highways in the case of TM and Time, and railways
in the case of Fiberail. In terms of legal impediments, firms must obtain licenses
to run cabling and erect infrastructure. Most land-based trunk cabling runs along
federal and not state roads, since it is much less costly and time-consuming to se-
cure a license from the federal government than from state governments. There are
substantial differences between state and federal roads. Federal roads tend to be
larger than state roads. Whereas the bulk of peninsular Malaysia’s federal road
system was built by the British before independence in 1957, the state road system
continues to grow rapidly.
Once the backbone has been laid, plenty of supplementary costs must be incurred
before an ISP can deliver its service to consumers. To serve a new area, an ISP
must install a local switch and connect it to the backbone via backhaul cable. This
step adds further trenching costs, which increase with distance to the backbone.
It also entails the costly and time-consuming process of getting permission from
local authorities. Even TM, which owned an extensive telephone network before the
advent of the Internet, faces these costs. TM had to upgrade much of its copper wire
to carry data signals, and dig up and replace its backhaul cable with fiber-optics to
provide the extra capacity and speed needed to delivery Internet.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Political Data
Malaysia is a federation of ex-British colonies. It is split between peninsular Malaysia,
which gained independence in 1957 and houses most of the population, and Sabah
and Sarawak, two less developed states on the island of Borneo that joined the fed-
eration in 1963. This paper uses election data at the state legislature level for the
1986, 1995, 1999, 2004, and 2008 elections. State elections are held at the same time
as elections for the national parliament, with the exceptions of the two states on
Borneo, Sabah and Sarawak. Sabah harmonized its state elections with the parlia-
mentary elections only in 2004, and Sarawak continues to hold its state elections on
off years. The data includes candidate names, parties, and votes along with turnout,
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the number of eligible voters in a district, the number of rejected votes, and the dis-
trict’s ethnic composition. I have manually entered each set of electoral boundaries
into ArcGIS to account for changes in district size and number since 1986.
Figure 2.1 shows state and parliamentary electoral district boundaries for the 2004-
2008 period. No redistricting occurred in this period. Parliamentary district bound-
aries perfectly match state legislative district boundaries, with each parliamentary
district comprised of two or three state districts.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics covering the 2004-2008 period for state legisla-
ture districts in peninsular Malaysia, excluding Kuala Lumpur. The 2008 election is
marked by a large drop in vote share for the BN and a modest increase in turnout.
The number of eligible voters varies significantly across districts, with a mean of
18,000 and a standard deviation of around 7,000.
2.4.2 Demographics and geography
I have complete geospatial data for Malaysia. Figure 2.2 illustrates clutter data
(which classifies all land as either urban, semi-urban, plantation, jungle, inland wa-
ter, or open) and elevation data (which allows for the calculation of land-gradients).
Figure 2.3 shows the locations of all major roads, highways, and railways in Malaysia.
Finally, figure 2.4 represents data from the LandScan service, which estimates pop-
ulation distribution at the one square kilometer resolution through a combination
of census data and satellite imagery.32
Table 2.1 helps make sense of the geo-spatial data. State legislature districts, on
average, are 21% urban and 50% farmland (rural), with the remaining 29% classified
as jungle. Although jungle covers large swaths of the country, the fairly extensive
road network spans more than 80,000 kilometers of roads as of 2007.
I have constructed a dataset of controls using the Population and Housing Census
of Malaysia for 1980, 1991, and 2000; Malaysia’s Household Basic Amenities and
Income Survey for 2004; and geographically disaggregated measures of GDP per
capita 2005, generated by the consultancy Booz & Company. Unless otherwise
stated, this data is available at the level of Malaysia’s 927 census districts, called
mukim.
32See <http://www.ornl.gov/sci/landscan/> for details on the construction of this dataset.
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Figure 2.5 shows mukim boundaries alongside state legislative district boundaries.
As can be seen, mukim level data does not match up perfectly with state legislative
districts. To address this discrepancy, I use the LandScan population data to assign
a weight to each one kilometer cell within each mukim. State electoral district values
are generated from the weighted sum of these one square kilometer cells.
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic society. Ethnic Chinese, the wealthiest group in Malaysia,
comprise 26% of the population. Brought in by the British as indentured servants
to work in the country’s rubber and palm plantations, Indians currently comprise
roughly 8% of the population. The remainder (65% percent) is largely Malay, except
for several ethnic groups on Borneo and a few small tribes.
2.4.3 Internet
I use official Internet measures from the Population and Housing Census 2000 and
the Household Basic Amenities and Income Survey (HBAIS) for 2004. Both datasets
provide the fraction of households with Internet subscriptions at the mukim (census
district) level. As explained in section 2.4.2, I use ArcGIS to aggregate the HBAIC
data to the legislative district level, which introduces some measurement error.
In the model in section 2.2.3, I presented two sufficient conditions for media capture
when average Internet access is greater than 50%. The first condition is rightward
skew in the distribution of Internet connectivity by district. Figure 2.8 shows an
approximation of the PDF for Internet subscription per household variable along-
side the PDF of a normal distribution. As can be seen the distribution is severely
rightward skewed. The second condition is a positive correlation between Internet
penetration and the fraction of total population. Figure 2.9 graphs a scatter plot
of the log of households with Internet subscriptions in 2004 against the fraction of
total eligible voters in a district. Showing a strong positive relationship between
these two variables, this graph implies that districts with larger populations also
have higher Internet penetration per capita.33
Since the census data does not cover the 2008 period, I turn to two extra sources
of data on Internet connectivity. The first, the GeoIP City database, is produced
by the geo-location company MaxMind. GeoIP City is a service that matches IP
33These results hold for alternate measures of Internet penetration for 2004 and 2008 explained in
section 2.10.
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addresses to geographical locations, allowing web services to tailor advertisements
based on visitor location and to detect fraud. The GeoIP City database comprises
monthly data from 2004 to the present and covers virtually all IP addresses in the
world.34 For each IP address assigned to Malaysia, the GeoIP City database provides
the name and location of the nearest large city on a monthly basis. Figure 2.6 shows
the spatial distribution of GeoIP data points for 2008. There are 782 locations that
appear in the data for 2004 and 487 for 2008. Although the 2008 data has fewer
locations, it has roughly twice as many IP addresses, reflecting the enormous growth
in Malaysia’s Internet penetration in the 2004-2008 period.
My second data source comes from APNIC (Asia-Pacific Network Information Cen-
ter), the regional Internet registry responsible for delegating blocks of IP addresses
to national Internet registries, ISPs, and large companies in the Asia-Pacific region.
As such it has a complete record of all IP blocks allocated to Malaysia along with
the recipient of the block (normally an ISP) and the date of allocation.
The GeoIP City database is used in conjunction with the APNIC dataset, which
together identify: the initial date of IP assignment to Malaysia, the ISP managing
the IP addresses, and the IP blocks location(s) during the 2004-2008 period. I create
the measure IPperV oter by aggregating this data up to the electoral district level
and then normalizing by the number of eligible voters. This gives the number of
IP addresses per voter in each state legislature district and is expressed in logs. I
check IPperV oter for 2004 against official government statistics on the percentage
of households with Internet subscriptions in 2004, and find a high correlation of .63.
Section 2.10 of the appendix provides a full account of the methodology employed
and the likely sources of measurement error.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Basic Correlations: OLS Estimates
I start by examining the basic relationship between Internet penetration and the
BN’s share of the vote at the state legislature district level. Figure 2.10 plots change
in voting share for the BN and growth in IPperV oter during the 2004 to 2008 period.
34MaxMind does not cover IPv6 addresses. However, IPv6 adoption was infinitesimal in Malaysia
at the time.
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As can be seen, there is a strong negative relationship in the raw data, implying
that areas with more Internet growth are associated with greater negative swings
against the BN.
I explore this relationship in more detail by controlling for other characteristics that
might affect changes in BN voter share. Let yist be BN’s vote share for legislative
district i in state s at time t and 4IPperV oterist be growth in IP addresses per
voter:
yist = α0 + α1t+ α2IPperV oterist + ρi + δit+ µs + λst+ εist (2.1)
Where ρi is the district fixed effect, δi is the district trend,µs is the state fixed effect,
λs is the state trend, and εist is an idiosyncratic error term. This equation, in turn,
can be rewritten in first differences, eliminating ρi and µs:
4yist = (yist+1 − yist) = α1 + α24IPperV oterist + λs + (δi +4εist) (2.2)
With two periods of data, it is not possible to estimate the legislative district specific
trend δi. OLS estimation of equation (2.2) will be biased as long as δi + 4εist is
correlated with 4IPperV oterist, which we would expect if Internet is allocated to
areas that are trending for or against the BN for unobservable reasons.
As a first pass, I augment equation (2.2) with a vector of legislative district covariates
(Xis) to control for some factors that might affect δi:
4yist = α1 + α24IPperV oterist +Xisβ + λs + (δi +4εist) (2.3)
OLS estimates for equation (2.3) for the 2004-2008 period appear in table 2.3. The
first column, reporting estimates of equation (2.3) with fixed effects and state trends,
indicates a strong negative association between change in BN share and IPperV oter
growth. As argued above, ethnicity is a central driver in Malaysian politics, with
non-Malays more likely to switch allegiances from 2004 to 2008. Since the Chinese
population is wealthier and more urban, it could be that IPperV oter is simply
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picking up this trend. In column (2) I control for this possibility by adding ethnicity,
and although the magnitude of the effect diminishes, it remains strongly significant.
In line with anecdotal evidence, Indians swung heavily against the BN relative to
Malays.35
Another concern is that Internet access simply proxies for wealth; the opposition
party PKR, for example, derives much of its support from wealthier Malays. In
column (3) I add a measure of GDP per capita as of 2005, and again the magnitude
drops, but the relationship remains very significant.
Finally, it could be that IPperV oter is capturing the effect of urbanization. As
mentioned above, rural districts traditionally support the BN. I control for urban-
ization of a district with the variables population density and the natural log of
eligible voters in 2004. Turning to the results of specification (4), the estimated re-
lationship between change in BN share and growth in IP addresses per eligible voter
remains unchanged. Meanwhile, there is no evidence of any relationship between
population density and voting trends after controlling for district fixed effects and
state trends. To give a sense of magnitudes, specification (4) implies that a one
standard deviation increase in IPperV oter growth translates to a 1% swing against
the BN.
As a further check, I run (2.3) for the 1995-1999 period, when Internet connectivity
grew from zero to 15%.36 As mentioned in section 2.3.2, the Internet was seen to play
a decisive role as early as the December 1999 elections. Significantly, demographic
composition of the electoral swing differed in the 1999 election. In 2008, Chinese
and Indian voters abandoned the BN in favor of the opposition; whereas, in 1999
minority voters stayed with the BN and the Malay electorate instead split. I create
a measure of Internet growth from 1995 to 1999, InternetHH, which is the natural
log of the percentage of households with an Internet subscription in 2000 (Internet
penetration was zero in 1995).
Table 2.4 provides the results. Column (1) shows that, in the absence of controls, a
significant positive relationship exists between Internet growth and change in vote
share between 1995 and 1999. I interpret this as picking up the fact that the bulk of
the swing occurred among Malay voters rather than the relatively more connected
35The coefficient on percent Chinese is also negative and significant, when percent Malay is the
omitted variable.
36I cannot run a regression for the 1995-2008 period because of redistricting between 1999 and
2004 and because my measures of Internet penetration are different.
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Chinese. Indeed, adding ethnicity controls in specification (2) renders the relation-
ship strongly negative and significant. In specifications (3) and (4), I control for
GDP per capita and population density, and the magnitude of the effect increases.
The results from the 1995-1999 period reinforce the initial finding of a negative
relationship between Internet growth and BN share of the vote. That this result
holds for a completely different measure of Internet growth suggests that the result
is not merely artifact of the IPperV oter measure. Moreover, since the relationship
holds in the presence of a different demographic shift in the electorate, there is
less reason to believe that unobserved state trends are driving the result. Notably,
that the relationship is larger in magnitude: a one standard deviation increase in
percentage of households with an Internet subscription implies a 2% swing against
the BN in 1999 (the total swing against the BN in 1999 was 11%). This is most
likely arises because InternetHH is measured with less error than IPperV oter.
2.5.2 Identification Strategy
Although the OLS estimates demonstrate a negative relationship between Internet
growth and change in BN share, it remains unclear if the relationship is causal. OLS
estimation of equation (2.3) will not identify the causal effects of Internet growth if
δi +4εist is correlated with 4IPperV oterist. If Internet connectivity is allocated
more heavily to districts that are trending toward the BN for unobservable reasons
(e.g., patronage) then αˆ2,OLS would be biased upward toward zero. If anything,
however, this would lead me to underestimate the negative relationship. A greater
concern is that Internet connectivity was allocated to areas that trended against the
BN for unobserved reasons, leading to a negative bias in my results.
To deal with these challenges, I use the distances from the centroid of a state to
Malaysia’s three largest ISP backbones as instruments (Zij) that are correlated with
growth in Internet penetration, but uncorrelated with district level characteristics
that influence voting behavior. As argued in section 2.3.3, cost, which is a major
determinant of Internet placement, increases in the distance to the backbone. Since
the backbones were being built in the 1995-1999 period, the instruments apply only
to the 2004-2008 elections. This produces the following system of equations:
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4yist = α1 + α24IPperV oterist +Xisβ2 + λs + (δi +4εist)(2.4)
4IPperV oterist = pi0 + Zijpi1 +Xispi2 + γs + τist (2.5)
The identification assumption is that, conditional on the baseline district character-
istics ethnic distribution, GDP per capita, population density distance to the
backbone does not affect change in vote share independently of growth in Internet
access. So long as the instruments are also uncorrelated with the bias in IPperV oter
toward large cities, they will produce consistent estimates even though IPperV oter
is measured with error.
The first endogeneity concern is that the backbones for Malaysia’s ISPs run through
areas more likely to swing against the BN for reasons that the controls do not
capture. Since the backbones pass through Malaysia’s most populous regions and
cities, the instruments could simply be picking up the direct effect of urbanization
on voting trends. I supplement my controls for population density (log of eligible
voters, log of total area) with variables based on satellite data. With clutter data
on land usage, I create additional controls for the percent of the district that is
urban vs. rural vs. jungle. Last, following Burchfield, Overman, Puga, and Turner
(2006), I control for the effect of physical topography on urbanization, constructing
a variable for the standard deviation of the land gradient.37
Another concern with my instrumental variables is that they are picking up the
direct effect of Malaysia’s major roads and railways on district trends (e.g., via
increased trade and exposure to outside information). For now, I include a control
for road density but will return to this issue in more detail in section 2.5.5.
In sum, I am exploiting exogenous variation in Internet supply due to geographical
constraints in backbone placement. I include state fixed effects due to differences
across states in terms of Internet connectivity and sociopolitical factors. Thus I am
exploiting within state variation.38
37All regressions have also been run with average land gradient, ruggedness, and the standard
deviation of ruggedness with no significant differences. See appendix for details of variable
construction.
38There are 11 states in the sample and 38.8 legislative districts per state.
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2.5.3 First Stage
Table 2.5 shows the first-stage estimates for Internet penetration growth in state
legislative districts, using growth in IP addresses per eligible voter as a proxy for
growth in Internet access. Column (1) shows estimates of equation (2.5) with min-
imal controls for ethnicity. The coefficient on distance to Time, which is highly
significant and in the expected direction, suggests that growth in Internet access is
decreases with distance from Time’s backbone.
For Fiberail, both a linear and square term are included. This is meant to capture
a non-linear relationship with IPperV oter growth due to restrictions on Fiberail’s
geographic area of operation until 2006, as mentioned in section 2.3.3.39 The negative
coefficient on the linear term can be interpreted in the same way as the coefficient
for distance to Time: Internet growth decreases as distance increases. The positive
square term captures the geographical limitation effect: the relationship between
Internet growth and distance to Fiberail becomes less negative until it reaches a
zero threshold.
Distance to TM’s backbone remains insignificant regardless of the specification. In
fact, even if I run the same set of regressions only including IP addresses assigned
to TM, the results are largely the same. This result is consistent with the idea that
the government exerted more influence over TM than its competitors, compelling it
to build out infrastructure in areas with low demand.
In specification (2), I control for GDP per capita. The size of the coefficients for
the instruments decreases yet remains highly significant. Column (3) shows that
including controls for population size and density does not noticeably alter the result.
In specification (4), I add geo-spatial controls for urbanization. The coefficients of
interest decrease slightly in magnitude but maintain their significance. Internet
growth demonstrates a negative relationship with population density, but a positive
association with percentage of the district that is urban. The most likely reason
for this result is catch-up: ISPs had already brought Internet service to the most
densely populated areas by 2004 and thus had the most room to grow in regions
that were urban but more sparsely populated.
Column (5), which includes a control for road density, is my preferred, baseline spec-
ification. The coefficients of interest are unaffected, helping to mitigate the worry
39The linear term by itself is insignificant. There is no evidence of a non-linear relationship for
any of the other instruments
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that the instruments are simply picking up the direct effect of roads on elections.
To give some interpretation of the magnitudes here, for every 10 kilometer increase
in distance to Time’s backbone, IPperV oter growth decreases by 0.18 of a standard
deviation.
Finally, in specification (6), I control for BN share in 2004. As shown, I find no
evidence of political interference on Internet roll-out. Several other results sug-
gest that demand, rather than patronage, was the primary determinant of Internet
growth. First, there is a strong positive relationship between GDP and Internet
growth regardless of the specification. Second, there is no significant correlation
between ethnicity and Internet growth, belying the government’s stated goal of ICT
investment as a way to promote a Bumiputera middle-class.
2.5.4 Instrumental Variable Results
The IV estimates appear in table 2.6. The specifications for (1)-(5) match their
first-stage counterparts from table 2.5. The coefficient on IPperV oter is negative,
significant, and of roughly the same magnitude throughout. The Hansen test does
not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term, lending credence to the identification assumption. The strong and stable
coefficients on ethnicity confirm the importance of race in the 2004-2008 elections.
The effect’s magnitude drops in column (2), suggesting that IPperV oter in (1) was
picking up some of the effect of GDP per capita. The result remains large and
significant, however, and in (4) the coefficient of interest returns to its previous size
once controls for urbanization are also included.
Column (5), the baseline estimate, includes a control for road density. As shown, the
coefficient on IPperV oter stays unchanged. GDP per capita loses its significance
altogether, suggesting that it was proxying for urbanization and road density.
To get a sense of the change in magnitudes, for specification (5) a standard deviation
increase in Internet growth translates to a 3.6% swing against the BN. Putting this
shift into context, IP addresses per voter doubled in the 2004-2008 period, while
share of the vote for the BN dropped from 63.9% to 52.2%. This implies that
Internet growth accounted for about a third of the vote swing.
The magnitude is substantially larger than the OLS estimate, which as I show in
the appendix, is likely due to measurement error biasing the OLS estimates toward
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zero.
2.5.5 Validity of the Exclusion Restriction
As a reminder, my identification assumption is that, conditional on baseline district
characteristics (ethnic distribution, GDP per capita, population density, road den-
sity, percent urban vs. rural vs. jungle), distance to the backbone does not affect
change in vote share independently of growth in Internet access. Though it is im-
possible to test this assumption directly, I perform some additional checks to assess
its plausibility.
Pre-Internet Trend Tests The most basic concern is that unobservable character-
istics of areas close to the backbone make those areas more prone to swing against
the incumbent party in general. I check for this possibility by examining the re-
duced form relationship between distance to the backbone and swings in previous
elections.
Since Malaysia regularly redraws electoral district boundaries, it is not possible to
run this exercise for the complete set of preceding elections. Fortunately, the 1969-
2008 period has only two other elections—1986-1990 and 1995-1999—in which there
was a sizable swing against the BN, and on both occasions boundaries were fixed.
I control for ethnicity and population density using the 1991 and 2000 censuses. I
also include controls for population density, road density, and land usage based on
2008 estimates. A large expansion in state roads occurred during this time, which
introduces error into my road density control. Finally, I control for GDP per capita
using a 2005 estimate for 2004-2008, 1996-1999, and 1986-1990. Results do not
change if the controls measured with error are dropped.
Table 2.7 shows the results of reduced-form regressions for the 1986-1990, 1995-
1999, and 2004-2008 periods. Columns (1) and (2) show a negative and insignificant
relationship between vote swing and distance to either backbone in the 1986-1990
period. Turning to column (3), the relationship to distance to Time shifts to positive
and significant at the 10% level during the 1995-1999 period. This makes sense since
both backbones were partway built during this period. However, as can be seen in
column (4), distance to Fiberail remains insignificant. In terms of the 2004-2008
period, column (5) indicates a positive relationship with distance to Time that is
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significant at the 5% level, and column (6) shows that the linear and square distance
to Fiberail variables are jointly significant at the 1% level.
Controlling for alternate channels A second major concern is that there are un-
observable characteristics of areas close to the backbone that only switched on in
the 2004-2008 period.
Since Time and TM run along Malaysia’s major roads, the greatest cause for concern
is that some characteristic particular to the distance to the roads (or an omitted
variable driving it) affected voting trends through some channel, which switched on
only after the 2004 elections. I believe this possibility is unlikely for several reasons.
First, the backbones travel along Malaysia’s federal roads, most of which were built
before 1980. Thus, the effects would have had to remain dormant for more than
twenty years.
Second, since Time and TM only travel along a subset of federal roads, we can control
both for distance to federal roads and distance to major roads. Table 2.8 presents
the results of equation 2.5 with additional controls for distance to major roads
and distance to federal roads. In specifications (2) and (3), I control for distance
to major roads and distance to federal roads using distance to Time, distance to
Fiberail, distance to Fiberail squared, and distance to TM as IVs. As illustrated,
the coefficient on IPperV oter decreases only slightly and maintains its significance
regardless of the control. In columns (8) and (9), I run the same set of regressions
but use only my road-based IV, distance to Time. In this case, the magnitude stays
largely the same. The standard errors increase substantially, but the relationship
remains significant at the 5% level.
Finally, I restrict my set of instruments to those based solely on the railway net-
work. In specifications (4), (5), and (6) we see that the coefficient on IPperV oter
remains highly significant regardless of the control. Comfortingly, the magnitude
stays largely the same as in the case using only road-based instruments.
Since Fiberail travels the length of Malaysia’s railroads, it is impossible to include
equivalent controls for distance to the railway. However, it is worth noting that the
railroad network was completed as early as 1931. Thus, to invalidate the instrument,
the effect of proximity to railroads would have to have remained dormant for 75 years
and then activate just in time to influence the 2008 elections.
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Other issues Another concern is the possibility of heterogeneous effects of Internet
access on voting. If the effect of Internet access on voting is more highly negative
for areas closer to the backbone, my identification strategy would lead to an over-
estimation of the effect. An example of this scenario is if areas closer to the Time
backbone are better able to exploit Internet technology through better education.
Were that the case, however, we would expect to see a markedly different coefficient
on IPperV oter when only distance to Fiberail is used as an instrument. This is
because many of the districts near to Time’s backbone are far from Fiberail’s back-
bone. However, as table 2.8 shows, the coefficient on IPperV oter is largely the same
across specifications regardless of the combination of instruments used.
I have run regressions controlling for change in ethnic distribution, eligible voters,
and population density between 2004 and 2008. The results are unchanged suggest-
ing that migration is not driving the effect.
2.5.6 Additional robustness checks
Placebo regressions As an additional check, I test whether Internet growth be-
tween 2004 and 2008 is higher in areas that were already predisposed to swing against
the BN for unobservable reasons. Running OLS on equation (2.3), I use change in
BN share for earlier elections as the dependent variable, but keep IPperV oter 2004-
2008 as the independent variable and use the same set of controls. As explained in
section 2.5.5, this analysis is possible only for two previous elections, 1986-1990 and
1995-1999, with the same limitations to the controls.
The 1986-1990 period is a good test case of whether places that experienced more
Internet growth between 2004 and 2008 were already more predisposed to swing
against the BN. The year 1990 saw an abortive move toward a multi-party system
in Malaysia with the BN suffering its worst setback since 1969.40 It won only 53%
of the vote, but managed to retain its two-thirds majority in parliament thanks to
gerrymandering.
Panel A of table 2.9 shows the results of regressing change in BN share from 1986
to 1990 on Internet growth from 2004 to 2008. As indicated, the coefficient on
40Two years earlier, divisions in the UMNO, the dominant Malay party within the BN, caused
a formal split in the party with a large number of UMNO politicians leaving to form the
opposition Malay party Semangat 46.
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IPperV oter proves small and insignificant regardless of the specification. This sug-
gests no correlation between support for the BN in the 1986-1990 period and Internet
growth in the 2004-2008 period.
Next, I run the equivalent regression for the 1995-1999 period, regressing BN share
1995-1999 on IPperV oter 2004-2008. Recall from section 2.5.1 that a robust neg-
ative relationship exists between growth in Internet connectivity (as measured by
the 2000 census) and BN share. Panel B shows that this result does not hold if
2004-2008 measures are used instead. No sign of a relationship between the 1995-
1999 election swing and 2004-2008 Internet growth appears, regardless of controls.
This suggests that the areas with the greatest swing in 1995-1999 differ from areas
experiencing the greatest relative growth in Internet access in 2004-2008.
2.6 Additional results
In this section, I consider the effect of Internet diffusion on additional electoral
outcomes. I start by checking the secondary prediction of the model: that Internet
growth leads to higher turnover once Internet penetration reaches a high enough
level. Next, I check if the Internet promoted greater turnout. Last, I predict the
outcome of the election if had there been no Internet growth over the 2004-2008
period.
2.6.1 Turnover
A secondary prediction of the model is that higher Internet penetration will yield
higher turnover in incumbent party seats once Internet access is sufficiently high. I
test this prediction by comparing turnover in seats defended by the BN during the
2008 elections when Internet penetration was greater than 50% to turnover in the
1999 elections when Internet penetration was below 20%. In contrast to previous
specifications the analysis is at the cross-sectional level. I run probit regressions of
a BN victory dummy on the level of Internet penetration while limiting the sample
to districts won by the BN in the previous election. Table 2.10 reports the results.
First, I examine the Internet’s effect on turnover in the 1999 election. Since Internet
penetration across the country as a whole had reached only 15%, the model would
not predict a significant effect on turnover of BN candidates. Turning to the data, I
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find no turnover in BN-defended seats in the states of Johor and Negeri Sembilan.
Since my empirical strategy exploits within state variation, I drop the 68 observa-
tions corresponding to these two states. I also drop 7 observations corresponding to
the state of Kelantan, where all BN-defended seats fell to the opposition. Specifica-
tion (1) reports the result of a probit regression for 1999. The effect, positive and
insignificant, provides no evidence that low levels of Internet penetration substan-
tially affect voter turnover.
In 2008 Internet penetration for Malaysia as a whole had surpassed 50%, high enough
for the model to imply an increase in turnover. Column (2) affirms this prediction,
implying that the BN had less chance of retaining a seat in districts with higher In-
ternet penetration. This specification includes the full set of baseline controls plus
distance to federal roads. Logit and linear probability specifications yield commen-
surate results.
To address endogeneity concerns, in columns (3)-(6), I instrument for IPperV oter
2008 using distance to the backbone. The coefficients on IPperV oter 2008 are
relatively stable across specifications (3)-(6), but much larger in magnitude than
the simple probit case, pointing again to measurement error biasing the result to
zero. In column (3), I include all instruments and the effect proves significant at
the 10% level. Turning to specification (4), I drop my weakest instrument, distance
to TM, and the significance jumps to the 5% level. In column (5), I restrict the
instruments to distance to Time and, in column (6), I use only distance to Fiberail
and distance to Fiberail squared. Although the point estimates remain similar, the
standard errors are much higher, leading to insignificant results. The most likely
explanation for the lower significance is that distance to the backbone variables are
weak instruments for the level of Internet access as opposed to change in Internet
access. The coefficients on the instruments in the first stage are largely insignificant.
Additionally, I run an IV regression for the equivalent linear probability model and
include the F-statistics from the first stage. As can be seen, the F-statistics are
much smaller than in the case when distance to backbone instruments for Internet
growth.
2.6.2 Turnout
Although turnout is not modeled, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons
to believe that access to better information on politician quality yields increased
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turnout (e.g., Banerjee, Kumar, Pande, and Su (2011)). I look at the effect of
Internet diffusion on turnout, focusing on the 2004-2008 and the 1995-1999 periods.
Turnout measures in Malaysia are noisy due to electoral irregularities. Allegations
of electoral manipulation range from phantom voters (in which deceased individu-
als still manage to cast ballots) to multiple votes by the same individual to vote-
buying.41 To address this challenge, I include an extra set of regressions that drop
districts with serious irregularities.42 For the 2004-2008 elections, 13 out of 427
districts are dropped. However, a lack of information on specific examples of ir-
regularities in earlier elections makes it impossible for me to do the same for the
1995-1999 period.
Table 2.11 presents the results. In specification (1), I run equation (2.3) using change
in turnout as the dependent variable. The relationship between Internet growth and
turnout is positive but significant only at the 10% level. In column (2), I drop 13
districts with indications of serious irregularities. As indicated, the magnitude of
the relationship rises and the significance increases to the 5% level.
Next, I employ an IV strategy, but the instruments prove much weaker in this
case; only distance to Time yields significant results. In columns (3) and (4), I use
distance to Time as an IV and include the standard set of controls, plus distance
to federal roads. In both cases, the size of the effect increases greatly. However,
the relationship is significant only if I drop districts with voting irregularities. To
give a sense of the magnitudes, column (2) implies that a one standard deviation
increase in Internet growth leads to a 0.5% increase in turnout. Column (4) implies
that a one standard deviation increase in Internet corresponds to a 1.5% increase in
turnout, or about half the change in turnout between 2004 and 2008.
Specification (5) shows results for identical OLS regression run for the 1995-1999
elections. Magnitudes are similar to OLS estimates (1) and (2), but standard errors
are also much greater, leading to lower significance.
2.6.3 Predicted results in absence of Internet
To put the previous results in perspective, I predict the outcome of the 2008 elec-
tion had there not been any Internet growth in the 2004-2008 period. Table 2.12
41See Pepinsky (2007) and Hai (2002) for details.
42See data appendix for details of irregularities.
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reports the results. Specifications (1) and (2) give the actual result for the 2004
and 2008 elections, respectively. As shown, the opposition captured four additional
statehouses in 2008. Specification (3) employs OLS equation (2.3) to predict results
assuming zero growth in IPperV oter from 2004 to 2008. The predicted percent
of seats captured by the BN increases in all states, and the BN retains one of the
four statehouses lost. Column (4) reports the estimated outcome with no Internet
growth using the IV specification. In this case, the effect is more pronounced: the
BN retains control of three of the four statehouses that switched to the opposition.
These results suggest that, without Internet growth between 2004 and 2008, the
BN’s 2008 election setback would have proven fairly modest, amounting to the loss
of only one statehouse.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding of the effect of Internet diffusion
on democratization. Focusing on the context in which the traditional media is
government-controlled, I have argued that the Internet can facilitate evolution to-
ward a two-party system by preventing any single agent from monopolizing informa-
tion. Malaysia provides a key opportunity to test this idea: ambitious investment
in an Internet free of censorship coincided with strict controls on all other forms of
media.
This paper’s central contribution is to quantify the effects of the Internet on demo-
cratic change, in the context of the huge growth in Internet penetration that has
accompanied Malaysia’s recent electoral upheavals. I present a model, based on
Besley and Prat (2006), in which an increase in Internet access undermines an in-
cumbent party’s ability to guarantee reelection through media control. In line with
the model’s main prediction, I find that Internet growth accounts for one-third of
the 11% swing against the BN in the 2008 state elections.
To put this number in perspective, I predict the outcome of the 2008 elections had
there not been any Internet growth during the 2004-2008 period. IV estimates imply
the BN would have retained control of three of the four statehouses that switched to
the opposition. Thus the BN’s ICT-based development strategy had the unintended
consequence of weakening its control.
I go on to test a secondary prediction of the model. I show that Internet growth
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can yield increased turnover if Internet access is sufficiently high. Finally, I find
evidence that the Internet can help spur higher turnout.
Another important contribution is a novel measure of Internet growth from 2004 to
the present. Such a metric is lacking for most countries in the world, including the
U.S.A. My measure of Internet connectivity uses IP geo-location data in conjunction
with regional Internet registry records. I smooth the IP address point data into a
surface using inverse distance weighting interpolation and then normalize by pop-
ulation. Finally I check the accuracy against an independent measure of Internet
diffusion from household census data. This measure is central to the paper’s results
as it allows me to track Internet growth at the state legislature district level. This
measure can also extend to research well outside the ambit of this paper. Equiva-
lent IP geo-location data exists for almost every country in the world and is only
becoming more accurate as the technology matures.
This paper presents some of the first evidence of the Internet’s quantitative effects
on political outcomes. However, there is much scope for future work. First, it is
important to get a better understanding of the channels of causation. The model
suggests that the Internet influenced elections via the media market. In line with
the model’s predictions, anecdotal evidence suggests a drop in the popularity of
BN owned newspapers and even a decrease in bias among some media outlets as a
means to reestablish credibility. Finally, it would be fruitful to explore the Inter-
net’s consequences in terms of economic development. Malaysia invested heavily in
Internet infrastructure to promote an information economy. An important next step
would be to gauge whether this investment paid off, as it would imply a relationship
between political openness and economic growth.
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2.8 Tables
TABLE 2.1
Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Dependent variables
∆BNShare 2004-2008 -.1211 .0933 439
∆Turnout 2004-2008 .0189 .0360 439
Independent variables
% Internet 2000 .1657 .1619 439
% Malay 2004 .6339 .2752 439
% Indian 2004 .07676 .0774 439
% Internet 2004 .1677 .1745 439
GDP per capita 2005 16668.72 7141.14 439
Eligible voters 2004 17716.52 7158.29 439
Population density 790.73 1404.24 439
% Urban .2148 .2390 439
% Rural .5022 .2501 439
Slope std. dev. 4.030 2.953 439
Road density .6153 .6272 439
Km to federal road 3.575 4.727 439
Km to major road 1.381 2.134 439
Instrumental variables
Km to Time 15.349 18.468 439
Km to Fiberail 22.400 28.184 439
Km to Fiberail sq 1294.351 3080.338 439
Km to TM 7.129 7.787 439
Notes. The table reports summary statistics for state legislature districts in peninsular
Malaysia, excluding Kuala Lumpur. Variables measured in 2008 unless otherwise stated. See
appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables.
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TABLE 2.2
Evaluation of Internet penetration measures
% households with Internet 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IPSumPerVoter 2005 0.360 0.580 0.265 0.621 0.628
IPMaxPerVoter 2005 0.463 0.511 0.373 0.533 0.539
IPAvgPerVoter 2005 0.317 0.459 0.169 0.492 0.515
IPFixPerVoter 2005 -0.055 -0.105 -0.584 -0.135 -0.133
IPSumPerVoter 2004 0.053 0.016 0.085 0.006 0.017
IPMaxPerVoter 2004 0.068 0.033 0.159 0.022 0.034
IPAvgPerVoter 2004 0.058 0.020 0.078 0.010 0.021
IPFixPerVoter 2004 -0.080 -0.128 -0.144 -0.153 -0.152
Kuala Lumpur Y N N N N
Sabah Y Y Y N N
Peninsular Malaysia Y Y N Y Y
N 518 505 60 445 433
Notes. Correlation between percentage households with Internet subscription 2004 and
self-constructed Internet penetration measures. Percentage Households with Internet
access in 2004 was derived from Household Basic Amenities Survey 2004. See section
2.10 for details on the construction and source of variables.
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TABLE 2.3
Relationship between BN share and Internet growth from 2004 to 2008
Dependent variable is ∆BNShare 2004-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IPperVoter growth -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% Malay 2004 0.164*** 0.133*** 0.130***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
% Indian 2004 -0.348*** -0.372*** -0.381***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.054)
GDP per capita -0.036*** -0.034***
(0.009) (0.010)
Log eligible voters 2004 0.003
(0.011)
Population density -0.002
(0.003)
N 427 427 427 427
R2 .441 .695 .71 .711
Notes. The table reports OLS estimates of equation (2.3). All specifications include 11 state
trends. IPperVoter growth is natural log of IP addresses per eligible voter in 2008 divided by IP
addresses per voter in 2004. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables.
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 2.4
Relationship between BN share and Internet growth from 1995 to 1999
Dependent variable is ∆BNShare 1995-1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
InternetHH 1995-1999 0.021*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
% Malay 1999 -0.299*** -0.294*** -0.285***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
% Indian 1999 -0.212*** -0.206*** -0.198***
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
GDP per capita 2005 0.012 0.008
(0.011) (0.011)
Log eligible voters 1995 0.012
(0.017)
Population density 2008 0.001
(0.001)
N 374 374 374 374
R2 .269 .576 .577 .579
Notes. The table reports OLS estimates of equation (2.3). All specifications include 11 state trends.
1999 election is from December 1999. Internet growth is the natural log percentage of households
with Internet subscriptions in 2000 (Internet access was zero in 1995). See appendix for details on
the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in
brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 2.5
First stage relationship between distance to backbone and Internet growth
Growth in IPs per eligible voter 2004-2008: 4IPperV oter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Km to Time*10 -0.115*** -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Km to Fiberail*10 -0.194*** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.158*** -0.156*** -0.157***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Km to Fiberail*10 SQ 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Km to TM*10 -0.015 -0.014 -0.024 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
% Malay 2004 -0.001 0.295 0.173 0.297 0.294 0.303
(0.196) (0.225) (0.238) (0.240) (0.239) (0.259)
% Indian 2004 0.134 0.405 0.093 0.388 0.457 0.483
(0.648) (0.661) (0.665) (0.682) (0.684) (0.725)
GDP per capita 0.384*** 0.465*** 0.390*** 0.402*** 0.404***
(0.116) (0.122) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127)
Log eligible voters 2004 0.001 -0.035 -0.035 -0.039
(0.157) (0.155) (0.155) (0.162)
Population density -0.077** -0.148*** -0.133*** -0.133***
(0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
% Urban 0.770** 0.965*** 0.962***
(0.335) (0.352) (0.351)
% Rural -0.033 -0.018 -0.019
(0.243) (0.243) (0.243)
Slope std -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Road density -0.131 -0.129
(0.086) (0.086)
BN share 2004 -0.056
(0.495)
N 427 427 427 427 427 427
R2 .307 .325 .333 .349 .351 .351
Notes. The table presents OLS estimates of equation (2.5). It presents first stage results for the relationship
between distance to backbone and growth in IP addresses per voter. All specifications include 11 state trends.
All specifications include state trends. IPperVoter is natural log of IP addresses per eligible voter in 2008
divided by IP addresses per voter in 2004. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets.
***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. See appendix for details on the construction
and source variables.
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TABLE 2.6
IV estimates of the relationship between BN share and Internet growth
Dependent variable is ∆BNShare 2004-2008
IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPperVoter Growth -0.036*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.009***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.003)
% Malay 2004 0.156*** 0.137*** 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.120***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
% Indian 2004 -0.331*** -0.350*** -0.362*** -0.374*** -0.371*** -0.396***
(0.055) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053)
GDP per capita -0.025** -0.022** -0.018* -0.017 -0.031***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Log eligible voters 2004 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Population density -0.004 -0.006* -0.005 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% Urban -0.008 0.004 -0.028
(0.025) (0.029) (0.026)
% Rural -0.009 -0.009 -0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Slope std -0.003** -0.003** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Road density -0.008 -0.006
(0.010) (0.010)
N 427 427 427 427 427 427
R2 .657 .686 .685 .67 .673 .717
F-Stat 18.1 13.1 12.9 8.5 8.7
Hansen Test (p-value) .75 .76 .73 .80 .82
Notes. Specifications (1) through (5) show results of IV regressions of change in BN vote share 2004-2008 on
IPperVoter growth 2004-2008. Instruments are distance to Time, distance to Fiberail, distance to Fiberail
squared, and distance to TM. Column (6) reports results from an ordinary least squares regression of BN
vote share 2004-2008 on IPperVoter growth 2004-2008. F-stat is the f-statistic of the instruments from the
first stage. The p-value for the Hansen test is for the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The
joint null is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error. All specifications include 11 state trends.
IPperVoter growth is the natural log of IP addresses per eligible voter in 2008 divided by IP addresses per
voter in 2004. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported
with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 2.7
Reduced form estimates of distance to backbone on elections
Dependent variable is ∆BNShare
1986-1990 1995-1999 2004-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Km to Time*100 -0.036 0.038* 0.041**
(0.026) (0.023) (0.016)
Km to Fiberail*100 -0.055 0.040 0.035
(0.047) (0.038) (0.030)
Km to Fiberail*100 SQ 0.033 -0.034 -0.057**
(0.035) (0.031) (0.023)
Road density 0.257** 0.269** 0.075 0.061 -0.004 -0.003
(0.120) (0.120) (0.104) (0.105) (0.010) (0.010)
Fiberail joint significance .72 .55 .001
N 325 325 368 368 427 427
R2 .507 .507 .567 .565 .715 .716
Notes. Reduced form regressions of change in BN share on distance to the backbone are reported. Columns
(1) and (2) cover the 1986-1990 elections; columns (3) and (4) cover the 1995-1999 elections; and columns
(5) and (6) cover the 2004-2008 elections. Fiberail joint significance presents the p-value of a test of the joint
significance of Km to Fiberail and Km to Fiberail squared. All specifications control for ethnicity, GDP per
capita, percent of the district that is urban and rural, the log of eligible voters, population density and 11 state
trends. GDP per capita is taken from a 2005 estimate in all cases. For all specifications population density,
road density, % urban, and % rural are calculated from a 2008 measure. Coefficients are reported with robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 2.9
Placebo regressions of ∆BNShare on Internet in a different time period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: Dependent variable is ∆BNShare 1986-1990
IPperVoter 2004-2008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
PANEL B: Dependent variable is ∆BNShare 1995-1999
IPperVoter 2004-2008 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Controls
Ethnicity N Y Y Y Y
GDP per capita N N Y Y Y
Population N N N Y Y
Road N N N N Y
Notes. The table reports OLS estimates of equation BN share change on Internet growth in a different
period. Panel A reports results of BN share 1986-1990 on IPperVoter Growth from 2004 to 2008. Panel
B reports results of BN share 1995-1999 on IPperVoter Growth from 2004 to 2008. IPperVoter 2004-
2008 is the natural log of IP addresses per eligible voter in 2008 divided by IP addresses per voter in
2004. All specifications include 11 state trends. Ethnicity controls are % Malay and % Chinese, from
each respective period. GDP per capita is taken from 2005 for panels A and B. Population controls
for population density, road density, % urban, % rural, and log of eligible voters. Log of eligible voters
is for 1986, 1995, and 2004, respectively, while the other controls are from 2008. Road controls for
road density and distance to federal roads as of 2008. See appendix for details on the construction and
sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. For expository clarity, coefficients on controls are
not reported.
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TABLE 2.10
Probit estimates of turnover on Internet
Probit IV Probit
1999 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPperVoter 2008 -0.286** -0.946* -1.041** -1.109 -1.011
(0.140) (0.557) (0.513) (0.702) (0.617)
InternetHH 1999 0.300
(0.222)
N 255 383 383 383 383 383
Pseudo R2 .436 .51
First stage: Dependent variable is IPperV oter 2008
Km to Time*10 -0.044 -0.040 -0.050*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Km to Fiberail*10 -0.007 -0.001 -0.005
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
Km to Fiberail*10 SQ 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Km to TM*10 0.070
(0.059)
F-stat 2.7 3.28 3.47 3.5
N 383 383 383 383
Notes. Probit estimates of turnover on Internet connectivity are reported. Specification (1) regresses turnover
from December 1999 on log % households with Internet subscription in 1999, and restricts sample to districts
won by the BN in 1995. Specifications (2)-(6) regress turnover 2008 on log IPperVoter 2008, and restrict
sample to districts that the BN won in 2004. All specifications control for ethnicity, GDP per capita, percent
of the district that is urban and rural, the log of eligible voters, population density, road density, distance
to federal roads, and 11 state trends. GDP per capita is taken from a 2005 estimate. For all specifications
distance to federal roads, road density, % urban, and % rural are calculated from a 2008 measure. F-stat is
the f-statistic of the instruments from the first stage of 2SLS estimate from the equivalent linear probability
model. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with
standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 2.11
Relationship between turnout and Internet growth
∆Turnout ∆Turnout
2004-2008 1995-1999
OLS OLS IV IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IPperVoter growth 04-08 0.0035* 0.0042** 0.0138 0.0157*
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0087) (0.0085)
InternetHH 1995-1999 0.0034
(0.0026)
Drop irregularities N Y N Y N
Time IV N N Y Y N
N 427 413 427 413 368
R2 .649 .641 .604 .586 .301
Notes. Specifications (1) and (2) show results of OLS regressions of change in turnout 2004-2008 on IPperVoter
growth 2004-2008. Columns (3) and (4) present results of IV regressions using distance to Time as an instru-
ment. Specification (5) reports results of regressions of change in turnout 1995-1999 on Internet subscription
per household growth 1995-1999. Drop irregularities drops districts with irregularities in turnout; see appendix
for details. InternetHH 1995-1999 is the natural log percentage of households with Internet subscriptions in
2000 (Internet access was zero in 1995). All specifications control for ethnicity, GDP per capita, percent of
the district that is urban and rural, the log of eligible voters, population density, road density and 11 state
trends. For specifications (5) GDP per capita is taken from 2005. Road density, % urban, % rural are from
2008. IPperVoter growth is natural log of IP addresses per eligible voter in 2008 divided by IP addresses per
voter in 2004. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported
with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 2.12
Results of state legislature elections without Internet
State BNSeats2004 BNSeats2008 ̂BNSeats2008OLS ̂BNSeats2008IV
Johor .982 .892 .946 .946
Kedah .861 .388 .361 .667
Kelantan .466 .133 .311 .489
Melaka .928 .821 .857 .857
Negeri Sembilan .944 .583 .75 .75
Pahang .976 .880 .928 .952
Perak .881 .474 .576 .644
Perlis .933 .933 1 1
Pulau Pinang .95 .275 .35 .45
Selangor .964 .357 .392 .554
Terengganu .875 .75 .812 .937
N 445 445 445 445
Notes. Table reports fraction of state legislature seats won by the BN alongside estimates in the absence of
Internet. Covers all state peninsular seats.BNSeats2004 and BNSeats2008 are the fraction of state legislature
seats won by the BN in 2004 and 2008 respectively. ̂BNSeats2008OLS is the predicted fraction of seats won
by the BN in the absence of Internet growth based on OLS equation (2.3). ̂BNSeats2008IV is the predicted
fraction of seats won by the BN in the absence of Internet growth based on the IV system of equations (2.4)
and (2.5).
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Political Boundaries
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.2: Peninsular Malaysia Land Use and Elevation
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Figure 2.3: Peninsular Malaysia’s Road and Railway Network
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.4: Population Distribution
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Figure 2.5: Legislative District vs. Census District Boundaries
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.6: Inverse Distance Weighting Interpolation
87
Chapter 2 The Unintended Consequences of Internet Diffusion
Legend
Fiberail Backbone
TM Backbone
TIME Backbone
TIME and TM Backbones
TIME Submarine Cable Station
Figure 2.7: Backbone Location
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.8: Skewness of Households with Internet 2004
Figure 2.9: Relationship Between Log Households with Internet 2004 and Fraction
of Total Eligible Voters
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Figure 2.10: Relationship Between Change in BN Vote Share and IP per Voter
Growth
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Appendix
2.10 Appendix A: Constructing a measure of Internet
penetration
Since official statistics do not cover the 2004-2008 period, I construct a novel measure
of Internet penetration, IPperV oter, at the state legislature district level.
I use the GeoIP City database and APNIC dataset, outlined in section 2.4.3, which
together allow me to identify: the initial date of assignment to Malaysia, the ISP
managing the IP addresses, and the IP blocks location(s) during the 2004-2008
period. IPperV oter is created by aggregating this data up to the electoral district
level and then normalizing by the number of eligible voters.
Challenges In creating this measure I had to address several sources of measure-
ment error:
1. Change in IP block location over time: According to Maxmind, in any given
month roughly 60% of IP addresses are correctly resolved to a city that lies
within 25 square miles of the actual location.43 To give a sense of what this
means, an IP address is not like a static telephone number: although it can
remain stable for long periods, it can also change locations without warning.
In many cases the IP address is simply reassigned to another computer in
the same general area. However, in some cases it may be reassigned to a
completely different part of the country. In the context of Malaysia, this would
most likely be a problem for smaller cities. Before a city passes a certain level
of connectivity, its IP addresses may be routed either to a regional hub or
directly to Kuala Lumpur. As a result, this measure will be biased toward
larger cities, especially Kuala Lumpur. Indeed, the monthly data is very noisy
with smaller cities disappearing and reappearing from month to month.
2. Change in IP geo-location accuracy over time: Not only are the locations
assigned to an IP address changing over time, but the accuracy of these
43This number is periodically updated and can be found at the following address:
<http://www.maxmind.com/app/city_accuracy>.
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IP/location pairings are increasing as well. The data for 2004 is particularly
unreliable.
3. Geographical Measurement error: The dataset only provides the coordinates
for the city center; it does not specify the city’s limits. Thus, an IP address
corresponding to a computer in a small town outside a city (and in a different
electoral district) may be incorrectly attributed to the city, introducing fur-
ther bias toward large cities. Furthermore, since only point data is available,
the boundaries between cities are unclear. This can most easily be seen in
figure 2.6, which presents GeoIP city center data alongside legislative district
boundaries. As can be seen, the point locations often appear on the border be-
tween two districts, complicating the task of divvying up IP addresses between
adjacent districts.
Approach To address these challenges I construct multiple measures of Internet
connectivity, each with different strengths and weakness, which I will test against
data from the 2004 HBAIS in the next section.
In response to the problem of IP locations changing over time, I test four methods
for assigning IP addresses to cities based on data from a year long period.
1. IPFix: I limit the sample to IP addresses that never change location over
the twelve month period and divide by twelve. This is the most conservative
measure, yielding the advantage that the IP addresses are almost certainly
assigned to the correct location. The disadvantage is that the majority of the
sample is lost with most remaining IPs assigned to Kuala Lumpur.
2. IPSum: I sum up the number of IP addresses assigned to each city over a
twelve-month period and divide by twelve. This is the second most conser-
vative measure, making equal use of all of the information in the dataset.
However, it likely leads to over-counting Kuala Lumpur. For example, there
are many cases in which ten or eleven out of twelve observations occur in a
single city, with the remainder going to Kuala Lumpur.
3. IPMax: I calculate the number of IP addresses assigned to each city for each
month. IPMax is the value from the month with the most IP addresses. This
measure is meant to account for under-counting of smaller cities. The assump-
tion is that, once an area obtains Internet access, it is unlikely to subsequently
have access physically dismantled. If a location does not appear in subsequent
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months, this is due to measurement error rather than a subsequent loss of
Internet connectivity.
4. IPAvg: I, again, calculate the number of IP addresses assigned to each city for
each month. I then take the average across months when the city appears in
the data. This approach is similar to IPMax, but aims to correct for possible
over-counting of small cities by IPMax.
To address the problem of noisy data for 2004, I create two sets of measures for
2004. The first relies on GeoIP data for 2004. The second uses data from 2005 to
infer connectivity at the time of the March 2004 elections. I drop all IP addresses
from the 2005 data that were assigned after March 2004 and then calculate the four
measures listed above. The assumption is that IP blocks assigned before the March
2004 elections are in roughly the same location in 2005.
To diminish geographical measurement error, I smooth the city point-data into a
surface, using inverse distance weighting (IDW) interpolation in ArcGIS. IDW inter-
polation assigns an IP measure to every point in Malaysia: the value at each inter-
polated point is a weighted sum of the values in the N known points, where closer
points get higher weighting. Figure 2.6 shows an example of IDW interpolation:
darker areas have higher numbers of IP addresses.44 I then calculate the average IP
measure for the entire district. Finally, I normalize by the number of eligible voters
in the district to generate two sets of measures, one based on 2004 data and the
other based on 2005 data: IPSumPerV oter, IPMaxPerV oter, IPAvgPerV oter,
and IPFixPerV oter.
Choosing the best measure Table 2.2 shows the correlation between the number
of Internet subscriptions per household (per the HBAIS 2004) and the IP per voter
measures outlined above. Specification (1) includes all state legislative districts for
peninsular Malaysia and the Borneo state of Sabah. Kuala Lumpur cannot vote in
state legislative elections because it was ejected from the state of Selangor in 1974
and made into a Federal Territory. For the sake of completeness, I include Kuala
Lumpur’s parliamentary districts. Sarawak, the other state in Borneo, could not be
included because it holds its elections for state legislatures on off years.
Turning to the results of table 2.2 we see that the measures based on 2005 vastly
44The process can be altered so that values are not calculated for areas over the sea. Since areas
over the sea are not included in any calculations, this does not alter the results.
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outperform their 2004 counterparts regardless of the specification. This leads me to
conclude that whatever may have been lost by relying on 2005 data is made up for
by greater accuracy in the dataset all around. Moreover, IPFixPerV oter, which
counts only IP addresses that haven’t changed location, performs very badly and is
in fact negatively correlated with Internet subscriptions per household.
In (2) I drop Kuala Lumpur, leading to an immediate increase in correlation for all
2005 measures apart from IPFixPerV oter. I interpret this result as arising from
the large bias toward Kuala Lumpur mentioned above. Since Kuala Lumpur is mea-
sured with such error and does not participate in state legislative elections, I exclude
it from my sample.45 In specification (3), I limit the sample to the 60 state legisla-
tive districts in the Borneo state of Sabah. As of 2004, Internet usage in Borneo was
sparse relative to the rest of the country. As a result, the GeoIP data contains very
few data points for Sabah, which in turn leads to very large bias when performing
inverse distance weighting interpolation. Thus, it is unsurprising that the correla-
tions for Sabah alone are low in comparison to (2) (Sabah + Peninsular Malaysia)
and (4) (Peninsular Malaysia by itself). Sabah’s markedly different ethnic makeup
and political structure also make comparison with the mainland problematic. For
these two reasons, I exclude Sabah from my sample.
In specification (4), which only counts peninsular Malaysia, IPSumPerV oter 2005
greatly outperforms the other measures. As an additional test, for each measure I
generate the corresponding 2008 value and calculate growth from 2004 to 2008. All
measures estimate negative growth for a few observations (i.e., the number of IP
addresses associated with a legislative district is greater in 2004 than in 2008). In
this period, the Internet penetration rate for the country as a whole increased from
40% to 60%, and the number of IP addresses more than doubled.46 Thus I inter-
pret instances of negative growth as measurement error. Again, IPSumPerV oter
2005 performs the best, with only 12 districts with negative growth out of 445;
IPmaxPerV oter has 21, and IPAvgPerV oter 50. For the remainder of this paper,
I use the natural log of IPsumPerV oter 2005 for my IPperV oter measure in 2004
and the natural log IPsumPerV oter 2008 for IPperV oter in 2008, and drop the 12
districts in which IPperV oter growth is negative. Unless stated otherwise, results
are largely unchanged by including these 12 districts. Of the remaining 433 districts
in peninsular Malaysia, I drop 6 regions because of uncontested elections in either
45Unless stated otherwise, dropping Kuala Lumpur has no significant effect on my results.
46See <data.worldbank.org> for national penetration statistics; APNIC for IP allocation numbers.
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2004 or 2008.47
Measurement error Specification (5), corresponding to the sample used in the
paper, indicates a correlation of 0.63 between IPperV oter and the benchmark.
Although this result indicates a strong correlation, it still leaves a large, unexplained
difference between the two measures.
There are several explanations for why this difference occurs. First, since HBAIS
data only counts households with Internet subscriptions, it most likely underesti-
mates the percentage of households with access to the Internet by omitting people
who access the Internet at work or in Internet cafes. IPperV oter should capture IP
addresses tied to work and to Internet cafes. However, since IPperV oter contains
no metric for intensity of usage, it would not take into account that hundreds of
individuals might use the same IP address on any given day.
For reasons stated above, much of this difference likely arises from measurement
error. The majority of this error consists of bias toward major cities, first because
of the nature of the GeoIP database, which only counts city centers, and second
because of the IDW interpolation technique, which treats the centers of major cities
as peaks, with connectivity decreasing as we move outwards.
Fortunately, though the measurement error is large, if anything it will lead to an
underestimation of my results below. Indeed, in Appendix 2.11, I show formally that
the under-sampling of IP addresses farther from major cities yields OLS estimates
that are biased toward zero. In section 2.5.4, I use instrumental variables that are
uncorrelated with the measurement error to derive consistent estimates.
47I’ve run a separate set of regressions including uncontested seats, counting BN share as 1 if the
BN wins unopposed and 0 if the opposition wins unopposed. Results are more significant.
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2.11 Appendix B: Derivation of bias from the
undersampling of Internet connectivity in areas
far from large cities
In this section I draw from Nunn (2008) to show that the undersampling of IP
addresses per voter for areas outside the largest cities will result in OLS estimates
of the effect of IP per voter growth on incumbent vote share that are biased toward
zero.
Denote the true log IP addresses per voter in district i as s∗it, the observed number
as sit, the distance to the nearest large city di and incumbent vote share by yit. di
is expressed as deviation from the mean. Assume the true relationship between the
change in log of IP addresses and distance from a major city is:
4s∗it = −αdi +4eit (2.11.1)
where α > 0 is and eit is i.i.d. and drawn from a normal distribution.
Next, turning to the undersampling of regions farther from large cities, assume that
the relationship between the observed change in the log of IP addresses, 4sit, and
the distance to the nearest major city is given by:
4sit = 4s∗it − γdi +4vit (2.11.2)
where γ > 0 and vit is uncorrelated with eit and di.
The true relationship between change in BN share and change in log IP addresses
per voter is given by
4yit = −β4s∗it +4wit (2.11.3)
where β > 0 and wit is uncorrelated with all other variables.
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If we perform a simple OLS estimate of the effect of observed IP per voter on BN
share, 4yit = b4sit +4uit, we get:
bˆ =
∑
i4sit4yit∑
i (4sit)2
(2.11.4)
Substituting (2.11.1) into (2.11.2) and taking the first difference gives:
4sit = −(α + γ)di +4eit +4vit (2.11.5)
Substituting (2.11.1) into (2.11.3) gives:
4yit = βαdi − β4eit +4wit (2.11.6)
Finally substituting (2.11.5) and (2.11.6) into (2.11.4) and taking the plim gives :
plimbˆ = −β σ
2
4s∗ + αγσ2d
σ24s∗ + γ(2α + γ)σ2d + σ24ν
(2.11.7)
where σ24s∗ = α2σ2d + σ24e
In the case where γ = 0 we are in the situation of classical measurement error and
the result reduces to standard attenuation bias.
If γ > 0 we are in a situation where the underestimation of IP addresses per voter
is increasing in distance from a major city. Since 2γ(α + γ) > αγ, (2.11.7) will be
biased toward zero in this case as well.
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2.12 Appendix C: Proofs of propositions
2.12.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As in Besley and Prat (2006), I focus on pure strategy, perfect Bayesian equilibria.
First I start with the voters. Since voting is sincere, each voter observes media
reports and updates the posterior probability that the incumbent is good γˆ. She
votes for the incumbent if and only if γˆ > γ. Suppose that viewers observe each of
the two signal realizations with positive probability. Then it must be that γˆ(s˜i =
b) < γ < γˆ(s˜i = ∅). To see this, suppose there is a pure strategy equilibrium where
the incumbent is kicked out if s = ∅: γˆ(s˜i = ∅) < γ. If this were the case, then
the incumbent would never buy off the media. This in turn would cause voters to
update their posterior such that γˆ(s˜i = ∅) > γ, a contradiction. This means that if
s = ∅ the incumbent party is always reelected and if s = b the incumbent party is
reelected if and only if at least half of the voters observe s˜i = ∅.
Now I move to the decision of media firms. Suppose that τW is so high that the
incumbent will never choose to capture the web based media firm. Next, suppose
that the mainstream outlet has been offered tM to suppress its signal and it knows
that the web firm will not suppress its signal. The mainstream firm’s payoff is:
piM =
 a
(
1− φ2
)
if she rejects
tM
τM
if she accepts
Thus she accepts if and only if
tM ≥ τMa
(
1− φ2
)
Finally, consider the incumbent. The web media is too costly to capture by def-
inition. If Φ ≥ 12 at least half of the voters will receive the bad signal and the
incumbent will lose regardless of whether the traditional media is captured. Thus a
bad incumbent will not capture either outlet and will be discovered with probability
q. If Φ < 12 a bad incumbent will capture the mainstream firm if the return from
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reelection is greater than the cost
r ≥ τMa
(
1− φ2
)
I have thus shown that the incumbent will capture the media under the conditions
specified in Proposition I.
2.12.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The effect on turnover and the media is explained in the text. The remaining results
follow directly from Proposition 1.
2.12.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is identical to Proposition 1 except for the equilibrium strategies and
decisions of the incumbent.
Consider the incumbent. Assume Φ ≥ 12 and either one or both of the following
conditions are met, such that φ < 12 for a majority of districts:
1. Internet penetration is rightly skewed around φ = 12
2. φ and ψ are positively correlated
Then a bad incumbent will capture the mainstream media as the conditions ensure
the victory in a majority of seats.
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2.13 Appendix D: Data appendix
Data Descriptions and Sources
Variable Description Source
Original Variables
BNShare Share of the vote won by a member of the Barisan
Nasional.
Election
Commission (1986,
1990, 1995, 1999,
2004, 2008)
Turnout Percentage of eligible voters who voted in a district.
Includes spoilt ballots.
Election
Commission (1986,
1990, 1995, 1999,
2004, 2008)
Turnover Dummy indicating whether BN retained seat. Election
Commission (1999,
2008)
Eligible voters Number of people eligible to vote in a district. Election
Commission (1986,
1990, 1995, 1999,
2004, 2008)
% ethnicity Percentage of the voters in a district who are of
each ethnic group. The omitted category is
Chinese/Other. This number is reported as part of
the election results in all major dailies.
Malaysiakini
(2004), New Strait
Times Press (1999)
Generated Variables
GDP Measure of average GDP per capita at the mukim
(census district) level, generated by the consultancy
Booz & Company. Aggregated up to the state
legislature district level using ArcGIS and
LandScan as outlined in section 2.4.2.
Booz & Company
(2005)
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InternetHH Fraction of households with an Internet
subscription at the mukim level. Aggregated up to
the state legislature district level using ArcGIS and
LandScan as outlined in section 2.4.2.
Household Basic
Amenities and
Income Survey
(2004), Population
and Housing
Census (2000)
% Ethnicity 1991 Percentage of the voters in a district who are of
each ethnic group. The omitted category is
Chinese/Other. Data is available at the mukim
level in 1991 population census. Aggregated up to
the state legislature district level using ArcGIS and
LandScan as outlined in section 2.4.2.
Population and
Housing Census
(1991)
Slope std The standard deviation of the average steepness of
land in a district. Calculated from digital elevation
satellite imagery using ArcGIS first to calculate the
slope at each point and then to derive the average
and standard deviation across a district.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
% Urban rural Percentage of a district that is classified as urban
and rural farm using satellite imagery. The omitted
category is jungle. Used ArcGIS to calculate
percentage at district level.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
Road density Kilometers of road in a district divided by total
area of the district. Calculated using ArcGIS.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
Population density From Oak Ridge National Laboratory LandScan
product, which uses census data in conjunction
with satellite information to estimate population at
the 1 km resolution. I use ArcGIS to aggregate up
to the district level.
LandScan, Oak
Ridge National
Laboratory (2008)
Km to roads Distance from the centroid of a district to the
closest major road and closest federal road as of
2008. The road data is from Pitney Bowes. ArcGIS
was used to calculate the centroid of each district
and then derive the distance measure.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
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Km to Time Shortest distance from the centroid of a district to
Time dotCom’s backbone. Location of Time
dotCom’s backbone from company records.
Distance generated in ArcGIS.
Time dotCom
(2004)
Km to Fiberail Shortest distance from the centroid of a district to
Fiberail’s backbone, which follows major railroads.
Distance generated in ArcGIS.
Pitney Bowes
(2008)
Km to TM Shortest distance from the centroid of a district to
Telekom Malaysia’s backbone. From 2004 annul
report. Distance generated in ArcGIS.
Telekom Malaysia
(2004)
IPperVoter The number of IP addresses per eligible voter.
Constructed with ArcGIS from IP geolocation data
from MaxMind in conjunction with records from
APNIC. See section 2.10 for details.
MaxMind
(2004-2008),
APNIC
(2004-2008)
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2.14 Appendix E: Appendix on Election Irregularities
There are several factors that lead to election irregularities in the 2004-2008 period.
First, there were some large discrepancies between the number of ballots issued for
parliamentary seats and their corresponding state legislature seats. Recall from fig-
ure 2.1 that each parliamentary seat is made up of a handful of state legislature
seats. Technically the number parliamentary ballots should be the same as the
sum of the ballots for all the constituent state legislature seats. However, there
were several large discrepancies in this respect, most notably the Kuala Tereng-
ganu parliamentary seat where there was a difference of 10,000 between the number
of parliamentary ballots issued (around 70,000) and the number of state legisla-
ture ballots issued. I drop seats where the discrepancies are suspiciously large: 5
state legislature districts corresponding to the Kuala Terengganu parliamentary seat
(Wakaf Mempelam, Bandar, Ladang, and Batu Buruk); and the 4 state legislature
districts corresponding to the Setiu parliamentary seat (Batu Rakit, Jabi, Langkap,
and Permaisuri).
The 2004 election was marked by unnaturally high turnout rates, greater than 90%
in several instances. To deal with this, I drop districts where turnout exceeded 80%
in 2004 and turnout differed by more than 10% from its level in the 1999 election.
Due to redistricting, boundaries do not perfectly match between 1999 and 2004.
In order to generate a 1999 turnout value for a 2004 district I use the population
weighted LandScan procedure outlined in section 2.4.2. This rule leads me to drop
6 additional districts: Lunas, Nenggiri, Sungai Udang, Chini, Kuala Nerang, and
Sungai Tiang.
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3 The Political Impact of the
Internet on US Presidential
Elections
3.1 Introduction
The Internet is said to have played a key role in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign:
the Obama campaign’s online fundraising arm brought in a record $500 billion in
small individual donations; and the campaign’s heavy use of social media purport-
edly contributed to the highest rate of youth turnout since voting was extended
to 18-year-olds. A common theme has emerged in the U.S. press expressed by the
American online magazine, Huffington Post: “were it not for the Internet, Barack
Obama would not be president.”1
We test the extent to which these assertions hold, looking at the effect of Internet
diffusion on campaign contributions, turnout and vote share in the U.S. presidential
elections. We focus on the 1996-2008 election period, starting from an election in
which the Internet had virtually no role, to arrive to the 2008 election in which most
commentators saw a powerful and almost decisive role for the Internet and social
networks.
We develop a proxy for Internet usage over the 1996-2008 period. To date there is
no publicly available data on Internet usage in the U.S. at anything below the state
level. We develop a county-level proxy, using data on the number of high speed
1See Schiffman (2008)
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ISPs that are registered with the FCC in a zip code. We test this proxy against
state-level measures and find a high correlation.
We also assemble a novel dataset of political outcomes, combining presidential vote
data, with turnout and a full record of campaign contributions going back to 1996.
A study of this sort poses a formidable obstacle: endogeneity of Internet penetration
could lead to correlations with the variables of interest, which do not accurately
reflect causation. To address the problem of endogeneity, we exploit geographic
discontinuities along state borders with different right-of-way laws. We argue that
right-of-ways laws provide an exogenous source of variation and determine the cost
of building Internet infrastructure.
We compare counties, on either side of state lines, whose unobserved characteristics
should be spatially correlated. By taking the difference between regions on either
side of the border and instrumenting by right-of-way laws, our methodology controls
for unobserved characteristics, providing us with estimates of the causal effect of
Internet growth on outcomes of interest.2
We find a strong causal effect of Internet access on share of the vote going to the
Democratic candidate and on campaign contributions. A one standard deviation
increase in Internet access translates into a 1.8 point swing to the Democrats and a
$3 increase in donations for every one hundred people. We find some evidence of an
effect on turnout a one standard deviation increase in Internet penetration trans-
lates into a .2% increase in turnout but this is not robust to our IV specification.
This study makes a number of contributions. First, it provides some of the first
quantitative evidence of the role of the Internet in U.S. elections. There is very
little economic research in this area right now. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) uses
survey data to show that, opposite to common wisdom, online news consumption
is not associated with higher ideological segregation than oﬄine news. From the
perspective of political science, Golde and Nie (2010) measures the effect of online
news on political participation and polarization. They also find no effect of online
news readership on participation or polarization. Andersen, Bentzen, and Dalgaard
(2011) looks at the role of the Internet in curbing corruption in the U.S., using
lightning strike density as an instrument for Internet diffusion.
From a theoretical perspective, there is very little work looking into the effect of
2In our use of spatial differencing to control for unobserved characteristics, our empirical method-
ology is similar to that of Duranton, Gobillon, and Overman (2011).
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online media.Edmond (2011) presents a model of media and regime change that
distinguishes between the effect of print and broadcast media and online social
media.
Although there are few papers looking into the relationship between Internet-based
media and politic outcomes, there is a rich literature on the political economy
of traditional media. From an empirical perspective research has been conducted
into the effects of newspapers on government responsiveness (Besley and Burgess,
2002); newspapers on reducing corruption (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004); newspa-
pers on federal spending in a district (Stromberg, 2004) ; radio on political violence
(Yanagizawa-Drott, 2012); and television on presidential elections (DellaVigna and
Kaplan, 2007).
From the theoretical side, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) find that increased
competition in the media market could lead to increased bias as newspapers slant
their news toward their readerships’ priors. Alternatively, Besley and Prat (2006),
presents a theoretical framework for government capture of the media and shows
how increased competition in the media market can yield better information on
candidate quality and increased turnover.
This paper relates to a growing literature that employs a methodology from spatial
econometrics to achieve identification. Naidu (2012) estimates the effect of 19th
century disenfranchisement of African Americans in the U.S. South, comparing ad-
jacent county-pairs on state boundaries. Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) use the
same methodology in an earlier paper to estimate the effects of minimum wages
on earnings. This paper employs a somewhat different method for comparing cross
border county pairs, supplemented by an instrumental variable approach.
We start in Section 3.2, delving into background on politics, media, and the Internet.
We present the anecdotal evidence that suggests a causal role for Internet access in
U.S. politics. In Section 3.3, we describe the data sources. Section 3.4 presents basic
results from OLS regressions and then moves onto our IV empirical strategy and
results. In Section 3.5 we conclude.
3.2 Background
In this section we will provide background on the growth of Internet usage in the
United States and then move on to the specific ways in which Internet based tools
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were employed by the Obama campaign. We will end with a set of predictions on
the effects of the Internet on election outcomes.
3.2.1 Personal Use of Internet
Internet use has grown enormously from 16% in 1996 to 74% in the 2008.3 This
masks an even greater change in the method and sophistication of usage over this
period of time. In 1996, AOL was still one of the main methods of accessing the
Internet, meaning relatively few people left its portal, effectively a walled garden
of curated and licensed content. Moreover, most connections were dial-up and too
slow for to display video content. Modern social networks did not yet exist. Bill
Clinton did have his own web-page during the 1996 campaign, but it was small, with
none of the fundraising and organizational tools that we see in modern campaigns.4
Unsurprisingly, only a small fraction of the voting population used the Internet for
political ends, 4% according to a Pew study.5 In contrast, in the same study Pew
found that as of 2008 a full 44% of the adult population used the Internet as a source
of political information, and that it was the primary source of political information
for 30% of the population.
Although the stereotype holds that a typical Obama supporter was more wired than
a McCain supporter, in practice the opposite is the case: 83% of McCain supporters
were Internet consumers as opposed to 76% of Obama supporters.6 However, much
of this is explainable by the gap in average income and education between the two
groups. Moreover, whereas the average McCain voter might be more connected, the
average Obama voter was much more likely to use the Internet to political ends.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of young voters aged 18-29, who, at
72%, were the most politically active online of all age groups.7 They also swung
disproportionately to Obama: 66% of the youth vote went to Obama in 2008 as
opposed to 54% to Kerry in 2004.8 Moreover, turnout among the youth was the
highest on record since voting was extended to 18 year-olds in 1972.9
3See data.worldbank.org
4See www.4president.us/websites/1996/clintongore1996website.htm
5See Smith and Rainie (2008) p.5.
6See Smith and Rainie (2008)p.10.
7The number drops to 65% for people aged 30-49, 51% for 50-64, and 22% for 65+. For additional
details see Smith and Rainie (2008) p.17.
8See Keeter, Horowitz, and Tyson (2008)
9See Falcone (2008)
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3.2.2 Campaign Use of Internet
New Media The Obama campaign exploited the Internet in a number of ways.
First, they made ample use of social media to further their cause both through Face-
book and the campaign website my.barackobama.com (MyBO). These tools helped
augment traditional campaign tactics: detailed information on supporters helped
improve mobilization, especially during caucuses; MyBO supplied tools allowing
volunteers to make calls on the campaign’s behalf from home; and MyBO and Face-
book centered tools also helped volunteers organize their own fundraising events,
connecting with friends they hadn’t seen for years.10 The Obama campaign’s ag-
gressive action in the social media space played out in exit-survey data. According
to Pew, 25% of Obama supporters used social networks for political ends as opposed
to 16% of McCain supporters.11
The Obama campaign also exploited the potential of online video to get their mes-
sage to a large audience without having to pay traditional advertising costs for
television. For example, a video of Obama’s speech on race relations got 6.7 million
views by November 2008.12 Again this translated into a gap among supporters: 21%
of Obama supporters shared political videos as opposed to 16% of McCain voters.13
All of these trends were especially pronounced among young voters aged 18-29, the
largest users of all types of social and online media: where 67% of young voters
reported watching online political videos; and 49% used social networks politically,
with 40% posting original online content relating to the campaign.14
Fundraising The area of Obama’s online campaign that has received the most
attention is fundraising, where the campaign brought in an estimated 500 million
dollars in online donations, eclipsing Howard Dean’s previous record of 27 million. In
fact the technology used for Obama’s online fundraising was developed by veterans
of the Dean campaign, a company called Blue State Digital. They built a number of
tools to make the effort more “social”: people could set their own personal targets;
run fundraising campaigns; and watch personal thermometers rise, which gauged
10See Talbot (2008)
11See Smith and Rainie (2008) p.11.
12See Miller (2008)
13See Smith and Rainie (2008) p.11.
14See Smith and Rainie (2008) p.17.
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how well they met their targets.15 The results in terms of exit polls is dramatic:
Pew reports that 15% of Obama voters donated online in contrast to 6% of McCain
voters.16 The results are equally striking in terms of type of donation: of the 6.5
million donations online, 6 million were in increments less than $100 and often from
the same person.17
3.2.3 Expected Outcomes
For reasons outlined in the above sections, we expect an increase in Internet access
to cause:
1. Increase in donations for Democratic candidate, particularly among small do-
nations less than $500 dollars. Due to the Obama campaign’s use of its online
portal to collect a record amount of small-scale donations.
2. Increased turnout, in particular among youth. Since the Obama campaign
employed extensive tools for interacting with and mobilizing voters, and usage
of these tools was highest among people aged 18-29.
3. Increased support for the Democratic candidate. Due to the tools used by the
Obama campaign both to convince swing voters (e.g. via video) and mobilize
voters.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Census Data
We use county-level census and survey data to generate controls for presidential
elections during the 1984-2008 period. Data on ethnicity, age, and sex is available
every for every election year. Data on poverty, income, education, and employment
is available for 1980, 1988, 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 so values for 1984 and 1996 are
calculated by taking the average of 1980 and 1988 and 1992 and 2000 respectively.
Alaska, Hawaii, D.C., and outlying U.S. territories are excluded from the sample
because their geographic placement makes them outliers and they cannot be used
15For more details, see Talbot (2008).
16See Smith and Rainie (2008) p.11.
17See Vargas (2008).
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as part of the identification strategy.18 There is very little change in counties during
this period: the sample size increases from 3076 counties in 1984 to 3077 counties
in 2008. Figure 3.1 shows a complete picture of the counties in the mainland U.S.
as of 2008.
3.3.2 Political Data
All political variables are likewise available at the county level, covering presidential
elections from the 1984-2008 period. Variables on absolute number of votes are
derived from FEC data.19 This allows us to derive a measure of Democratic vote
share for each presidential election.
Turnout is also calculated at the county level. It is the ratio of the number of votes
cast divided by the estimated voting age population per data from the U.S. Census
Bureau.
Donation data is also available for all elections from the FEC. However it does not
include donations less than $200 unless these donations are from the same individual
and add up to more than $200. As a result, the sample misses a significant amount of
smaller donations. However, since the Obama campaign made the greatest inroads
among small donors, raising half a billion dollars, if anything this should work against
our results. We create measures in per capita terms: total amount donated; total
amount donated to Democrats; total amount donated to Democrats less than $500.
3.3.3 Right-of-Way Data
Different levels of broadband penetration across states can be attributed in part to
different regulatory regimes concerning Right-of-Ways (ROW) laws. According to
Day (2002), the current ROW regime can be traced to the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, which allowed municipalities to regulate the public ROW. States passed
their own laws concurrent with the Telecommunications Act that either limited or
reinforced this municipal right, leading to the significant variation in ROW regula-
tions across states that we see today.
18OLS results are robust to the inclusion of these observations.
19See David Leip’s Election Atlas at uselectionatlas.org.
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ROW laws can be broken down into a number of different categories, which influence
the cost for ISPs to lay infrastructure:20
1. Jurisdiction: In some states an ISP has to get permission to build on the
public ROW from every single municipality that the project crosses, whereas
in other states this is handled by a centralized authority.
2. Compensation: Compensation demanded by municipalities in return for grant-
ing ROW permission ranges from cost recovery (the cost to the municipality
of administering the ROW) to a rental fee (e.g. percentage of gross revenue)
to a flat tax.
3. Timeliness: Some states have a maximum time for processing permit applica-
tions, significantly speeding up the process.
4. Mediation and Condemnation: States also vary in how they deal with conflicts
between municipalities and ISPs, and private landowners and ISPs. For exam-
ple, in Vermont, landowner complaints can be heard on a wide range of issues
including aesthetics, and decisions are appealable to the Vermont Supreme
Court. On the other extreme is Texas, where most factors are not appealable
and landowners must pay the ISPs legal expenses if they lose in court.
5. Remediation and Maintenance: These laws dictate issues such as in what state
of repair ISPs must maintain their facilities. For example, if a sidewalk is torn
in order to lay cabling, these laws determine to what extent the sidewalk would
need to be restored to its original state and under what time frame.
In 2002 TechNet, an industry lobbying organization that counts almost every major
technology company among its members, released a report on the state regulations
influencing supply and demand of broadband.21 As part of this report, the authors
compiled an index, ranking the regulatory regime in terms of ROW laws across
states.22 We use this index to capture the regulatory difference in ROW laws across
states.
We will return to this issue in Section 3.4.2, where we will show the extent to which
ROW laws influence differential levels of broadband diffusion.
20See NARUC (2002) for more details.
21See Kende and Analysys (2002).
22See Kende and Analysys (2002) for details on the construction of this index.
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3.3.4 Internet Data
The U.S. lacks comprehensive, publicly available data on broadband usage and avail-
ability at anything finer than the state level. ISPs won’t release private information
on subscribers due to its proprietary nature, and survey data is scant. We use a
common alternate measure, the number of broadband providers operating in a zip
code, to proxy for broadband usage.
This data was collected by the FCC’s Form 477 on a semi-annual basis for 1999-
2010 from all high speed providers with more than 250 high speed lines in a state.
A provider is counted as high speed if transfer speed is greater than 200 kilobits
per second in at least one direction. The data does not differentiate between cable,
DSL, satellite, residential, or business providers. A provider is counted if they have
at least one subscriber in a zip code.
We make two assumptions that allow us to integrate this data into our analysis.
First, the number of providers in zip codes with less than three providers but more
than zero is not provided. We take the average and count all these areas as two.
Second, there is no information for the 1996 period. Since high speed lines were
non-existent at this time outside of a few universities and companies, we assume
that high speed connectivity was zero at this time.
There are a number of reasons that this is a good proxy for Internet take-up. In
table 3.1 we regress the log of high-speed lines per capita on log providers. As can be
seen in specification (1) even without controlling for population or state-year fixed
effects, the relationship between log providers and log of high-speed lines is positive
and highly significant with an r-squared of .54. The strength of this relationship
is unaffected by introducing a control for population in specification (2) and the r-
squared increases. In specifications (3) and (4) state-year fixed effects are introduced,
barely affecting the coefficient on log providers and yielding markedly higher within
r-squared values. Specification (3) can be seen graphically in figure 3.2, which shows
a strong positive relationship apart from three outliers in the bottom right corner.
In specifications (5) and (6) we drop these outliers, yielding a far more significant
relationship and, in the last case, a within r-squared of .96.
One concern is that this relationship is far less significant at the county level. Fortu-
nately Kolko (2010) analyzes the relationship between high-speed Internet adoption
and a number of providers at the zip code level, using zip-code level survey data
from Forrester. As can be seen in figure 3.3 from Kolko (2010), there is a strong
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positive, monotonic relationship between the number of providers in a zip code and
its level of high-speed Internet take-up. The only outliers are at the extremes of the
distribution for which there are very few observations: zip codes with zero providers
and zip codes with greater than 20 providers.
We aggregate the data up to the county level, weighing zip codes by their popula-
tion.23 Although the relationship between number of providers and Internet take-up
is significant, there are several factors that introduce measurement error. High-
speed Internet does not include dial-up connections, which, as we saw in Section
3.2.1, allowed 16% of the population to connect to the Internet in 1996. We don’t
think this will introduce much error into our results for a number of reasons. First,
as mentioned in the same section above, only 4% of the population reported using
the Internet for obtaining political information in 1996. Moreover, given the speed
limitations inherent in dial-up, many of the modern techniques employed by cam-
paigns such as video streaming are not available. Another concern is that in some
cases, this measure may only be proxying for the competitiveness of ISP markets in
a county. Although this will certainly introduce error, the strong correlation that
we find between the number of ISPs and high-speed Internet adoption reassures us
that there will still be substantial variation related to Internet usage.
3.4 Method and Results
Our econometric analysis is based on panel data regressions of the form:
yist = αi + βt + µInternetist + ξxist + λst + εist (3.4.1)
where yist is an outcome variable in county i and state s at time t; Internetist is
the number of providers; xist are other exogenous variables; αi is the county fixed
effect; βt is the year fixed effect; and λst is the year state trend.
The county fixed effect captures county-specific, time-invariant factors. The year
fixed effect captures common shocks in particular years. λst captures trends common
across counties within a state.
23In almost every case, a zip code fits within a singe county. All results reported below are robust
to omitting observations containing zip codes that span multiple counties.
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3.4.1 Basic Results
Table 3.2 looks at the relationship between share of the vote for the Democratic
presidential candidate and the growth in ISPs from 1996-2008. Column (1) shows
a large and significant association between Democrat share and the number of ISP
providers, implying that counties with more Internet are also more prone to vote
for Democratic candidates. In general Internet is cheaper to install in high density
areas, where a large number of households can be connected without having to lay
long stretches of cable. Since the Democratic party performs better in urban areas,
a primary concern is that we are simply capturing this effect. Column (2) helps allay
this concern: we introduce a first set of controls for average age, percent male, and
population density. The magnitude of the effect decreases slightly, but it remains
highly significant. In column (3) we further control for the ethnic make-up of the
county. The coefficient on our Internet measure remains highly significant, although
not as strong. In column (4), controls are added for percent of the population below
the poverty line and for the log of income. As we can see the results are barely
changed.
Column (5) shows estimates with a full set of controls, including controls for ed-
ucation. The strength of the association diminishes, but is still highly significant,
showing a strong relationship between Democrat vote share and Internet growth in
the face of a wide variety of controls. To give an interpretation of the coefficient, a
one standard deviation increase in the number of providers translates into a .3 point
swing towards the Democratic candidate.
Finally, there is the possibility of a non-linear relationship between Internet penetra-
tion and unobservables. We look into this problem in column (6) by incorporating
a lagged dependent variable into the model. We include lagged Democrat election
share on the right hand side without fixed effects, exploring the possibility that
current election results are influenced by past election results. The coefficient on
ISP providers is still positive and significant, but much smaller in magnitude. Per
Pischke and Angrist (2010), this provides us with a lower bound on our estimate,
providing significant results even in the case where the true model is a lagged de-
pendent model.24
24Conversely, if the fixed effects model is the true model, the lagged dependent variable specifica-
tion will underestimate the size of the coefficient of interest. See Pischke and Angrist (2010)
(p. 246) for more details.
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In Table 3.3 we look at results for the other outcomes of interest with our full set
of controls. Column (2) shows a strong association between Internet access and
turnout. A one standard deviation increase in internet penetration translates into
a .2% increase in turnout.
Columns (3)-(6) move on to per capita donation results. In column (3) we see a
strong relationship between total donations per capita to both parties and Internet
penetration. To give a sense of magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in
Internet penetration translates into a $3 increase in donations for every hundred
people. This relationship remains positive and significant for all outcome variables:
donations per capita less than $500 in column (4), total donations per capita to
Democrats in column (5), and per capita donations under $500 to Democrats in
column (6).
In Table 3.4, we run the same set of regressions with a lagged dependent variable
and no fixed effects. Column (2) shows that turnout loses its significance under this
specification. Similarly, donations results lose their magnitude and significance in
columns (3)-(5). However, column (6) shows that the relationship between Internet
access and per capita Democratic donations less than $500 remains significant. This
result is in line with the anecdotal evidence that suggests that the greatest effect
was on small scale donations to the Democratic candidates.
In sum, we find a strong relationship between Internet access and fraction of the
vote for the Democratic candidate, and with donations to the Democratic party
under $500 dollars. Strong, but less robust associations have also been found with
turnout and donations on other levels.
3.4.2 Endogeneity Concern
While fixed effects control for any time-invariant county characteristics and the
state trend accounts for any state level shocks, there is still the possibility of county
level shocks. In particular, if the Internet is allocated more heavily to areas that
are trending linearly towards the Democrats for unobservable reasons, then the
preceding specifications will overestimate the result.25
25For example, Stephens-Davidowitz (2011) provides evidence that racism played a large role in
the outcome of the 2008 election. If racism was on the decline in areas with more Internet
penetration, my results would be overestimated.
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To address this concern, we use an instrumental variable approach, exploiting ex-
ogenous variation across state borders in Internet supply due to different ROW laws
as outlined in Section 3.3.3. Limiting our sample to counties on either side of a
state border, we use the state level broadband index discussed in Section 3.3.3 as
our instrument (Wij). We further limit our sample to border’s that have at least
five counties on either side, which can be seen in Figure 3.1.26 Our specification is
as follows:
yist = α1i + βyear1t + µInternetist + ξxist + εist (3.4.2)
Internetist = α2i + βyear2t +
2008∑
t=1996
θstBBIndexst ∗ year2t + ξxist + ωist (3.4.3)
The identification assumption is that, conditional on the baseline county character-
istics income, poverty, education, ethnicity, population density, age, gender the
broadband index does not affect change in vote share independently of growth in
Internet access. Since the instrument is at the state rather than county level, this
approach is equivalent to comparing the average of counties along state borders.
3.4.3 First Stage and Reduced Form
Table 3.5 presents the results of the first stage regressions. The relationship is
positive and significant, implying that more favorable ROW laws are associated
with higher Internet penetration in a state. In columns (2) to (5), we steadily add
controls; the coefficients on our broadband index year interaction terms are for the
most part unchanged, except in specification (5) where we control for education as
well. In this case we note a small drop in the magnitude of the relationship, but not
the significance. The F-Stat is low and unchanged across specifications.
Table 3.6 shows the results of reduced form regressions of Democratic vote share
on our measure of ROW laws. In specifications (1) through (5), the coefficients
26Our results are robust to a minimum county range of 3-7.
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are positive, significant and relatively unaffected by introducing new controls. If
anything the relationship becomes more significant as controls are introduced.
3.4.4 IV Results
IV regressions of Democratic vote share on Internet growth are presented in table
3.7. Specification (1) presents basic results without any controls. The relationship is
positive and highly significant, implying that increased Internet access is associated
with higher Democratic vote share. As in the OLS case, a primary concern with our
identification strategy is that we are simply capturing the effects of urbanization.
Specification (2) presents a first set of controls for this, in particular population
density. As can be seen, the coefficient on the number of providers is largely the
same and highly significant. In specification (3) controls for ethnicity are included
as well, with almost no change in results. In specification (4), we add controls
for income and poverty and the coefficient of interest is unchanged. Finally in
specification (5) we round out our full set of controls with variables for education,
and there is little effect on the coefficients of interest. Together, the results imply
that a one standard deviation increase in Internet access translates into a 2.1 point
swing towards the Democratic candidate.
Specification (6) presents OLS results for the limited sample of counties on either
side of state lines. The association is still positive and significant, but is smaller in
magnitude. We attribute much of this difference to attenuation bias from measure-
ment error. As recounted in Section 3.3.4, the number of ISP providers in a county
is a noisy proxy for Internet access.
In table 3.8, we present results of regressions for our other outcomes of interest. The
results largely match our earlier OLS results with lag. Specification (2) implies a
positive but insignificant relationship between turnout and the number of providers.
Columns (3) and (4) show positive but insignificant relationships between Internet
penetration and total donations and donations less than $500 respectively. In column
(5) we see a large and positive relationship between donations to the Democratic
candidate and Internet growth. In this case, a one standard deviation increase in
Internet providers leads to a $2 increase in donations to the Democratic Party for
every hundred people. Likewise column (6) implies a significant, strong relationship
with donations less than $500 to the Democratic Party. Both these results agree
118
3.4 Method and Results
with the anecdotal evidence: that the Democratic Party made better use of online
fund-raising, in particular for small donations.
3.4.5 Robustness Checks
Pre-Internet Trend Tests The fundamental worry with our identification strategy
is that areas with higher right-of-way index ratings are more likely to swing towards
the Democratic candidate for unobservable reasons. We test for this possibility in
table 3.9, looking at the reduced-form relationship between change in Democratic
candidate vote share and the ROW index for elections in the pre-Internet period.
All the specifications include a full set of controls. In specifications (1) and (2),
corresponding to the pre-Internet period, we see no evidence of a reduced form re-
lationship between vote share and Internet growth. In columns (3) through (5),
corresponding to the 1996-2008 period, we see in each case a strong, positive co-
efficient on the ROW Index variable. This suggests that the results are not being
driven by unobservable characteristics of areas with high ROW index scores in the
pre-Internet period.
Placebo Regressions As an additional robustness check, in table 3.10 we test
whether areas with higher Internet penetration were more likely to swing towards
the Democratic candidate. For the pre-Internet period, we regress change in share of
the vote on change in Internet from the 2004-2008 period.27 Specification (1) looks
at the 1988-1992 period and includes a full set of controls. As can be seen, there is no
significant relationship between change in vote share and growth in Internet access
over the 2004-2008 period. Likewise, column (2) shows that there is no significant
relationship for the 1992-1996 period, when Internet usage was very small and had
yet to spread into the general population. Interestingly, as can be seen in columns
(3) and (4), the coefficient on Internet growth is insignificant for the 1996-2000
and 2000-2004 periods. Specification (5) shows that the coefficient is positive and
highly significant only for the 2004-2008 period. This implies that the majority of
the effect on vote share is driven by the 2004-2008 period. This result agrees with
the anecdotal evidence, which ascribes the majority of the effort by the Democratic
candidate to harness the Internet for electoral advantage to the 2004-2008 period.
27Results are the same if we use change in Internet for the 1996-2000 or 2000-2004 periods.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides some of the first empirical evidence on the effect of the rapid rise
in Internet usage in the U.S. on the basic functioning of the political process. We
focus on presidential elections for the 1996-2008 period, when Internet usage rose
from 16% of the population accessing Internet via dial-up to 74% of the population
accessing the Internet primarily from high-speed connections.
This paper’s central contribution is to find a strong causal effect of Internet diffusion
on presidential vote share and campaign contributions in the U.S. We find that a
one standard deviation increase in Internet access translates into a 1.8 point swing
to the Democrats and an $3 increase in donations for every one hundred people. We
find limited evidence of an effect on turnout, implying that a one standard deviation
increase in Internet penetration translates into a .2% increase in turnout. However,
this result is not robust to our IV specification.
There is much scope for future research. First, our current identification strategy
exploits state level exogenous variation. As a robustness check, we aim to use
the identification strategy from Naidu (2012) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010),
which works at the county level. Second, there is much work to be done in terms of
disentangling the effects on sub-groups. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests
that voter outreach and donation elicitation was most effective among young voters.
Finally, the effect of Internet diffusion on presidential voting opens many questions
into the channels of causality. Did the Internet act primarily as a platform for
coordinating the base or did it help convince new voters? Which platform was
the most effective and how does the introduction of these platforms interact with
traditional media sources? Is there any evidence of the Internet driving increased
polarization?
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Figure 3.1: Counties in Sample
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TABLE 3.1
Correlations between providers and high-speed lines per capita
Log of high-speed lines per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log providers 1.2668*** 1.3984*** 1.3100*** 1.2630*** 1.0866*** 0.2167***
(0.109) (0.116) (0.163) (0.166) (0.045) (0.067)
Population -0.0448*** -0.2207
(0.007) (0.144)
Constant -1.9937*** -2.1597*** -3.0215*** -1.6887* -1.3596*** -0.3973***
(0.384) (0.387) (0.353) (0.939) (0.153) (0.148)
N 452 452 452 452 449 449
R2 .5414 .5754 .7993(W) .8005(W) .5613 .9558(W)
State and year FE N N Y Y N Y
Notes. This table presents the regression of the log of the number of ISP providers in a state on the number of
high-speed lines per capita. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients
are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels.
Figure 3.2: Correlation Between Providers and High Speed Lines per Capita
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Figure 3.3: Predicted Broadband Adoption by Zip Provider Count. Note. Solid
line represents predicted values, and dotted lines represent upper and lower bounds
of 95% confidence interval. Source: Kolko (2010).
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TABLE 3.2
OLS estimates of democrat vote share on ISP growth
Democrat share 1996-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ISP providers 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.032*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Democrat share: t-1 0.949***
(0.004)
Avg. age 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
% Male -0.262*** -0.383*** -0.385*** -0.374*** -0.072***
(0.069) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.015)
Log pop. density 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.046*** 0.003***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.000)
% Black 0.404*** 0.398*** 0.356*** 0.086***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.004)
% Hispanic 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.039** 0.073***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.006)
% Asian 0.688*** 0.691*** 0.433*** -0.100***
(0.142) (0.141) (0.132) (0.026)
% Poverty 0.011 -0.042 -0.005
(0.036) (0.036) (0.018)
Log income -0.014 -0.009 -0.011***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004)
% Less than HS 0.226*** -0.055***
(0.039) (0.011)
% Some college -0.270*** -0.022**
(0.043) (0.011)
% College degree 0.110** 0.090***
(0.044) (0.008)
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y N
Lag. dep. Var. N N N N N Y
N 12227 12227 12227 12227 12227 12226
R2 .656 .662 .675 .675 .687 .95
Notes. Specifications (1) through (5) report OLS estimates of equation 3.4.1 with fixed effects and state
time trends. ISP Providers, our proxy for Internet diffusion, is the number of high speed Internet providers
registered in a county. Column (6) adds a lagged dependent variable and drops fixed effects and time trends.
See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 3.3
OLS estimates of vote share, turnout, and donations on ISP growth
% Democrat Turnout Total Donats Dem Dem
donats < $500 donats donats < $500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ISP providers 0.032*** 0.024*** 1.067*** 0.176*** 0.065*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.222) (0.047) (0.023) (0.009)
Avg. age 0.003*** -0.003*** 0.106** 0.044*** 0.008** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.049) (0.012) (0.004) (0.001)
% Male -0.374*** -0.910*** 5.075* 0.516 0.440* 0.128
(0.072) (0.136) (2.916) (0.654) (0.242) (0.102)
Log pop. density 0.046*** -0.020 -2.231*** -0.552*** -0.187*** -0.079***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.649) (0.133) (0.064) (0.026)
% Black 0.356*** -0.308*** -7.370*** -1.618*** -0.863*** -0.320***
(0.044) (0.084) (1.911) (0.349) (0.165) (0.065)
% Hispanic 0.039** -0.230*** -1.917* -0.768*** -0.396*** -0.207***
(0.019) (0.046) (1.132) (0.205) (0.102) (0.045)
% Asian 0.433*** 0.545*** 45.238*** 12.510*** 7.331*** 3.728***
(0.132) (0.204) (13.828) (2.836) (1.582) (0.790)
% Poverty -0.042 0.054 3.860** 0.705* 0.113 0.066
(0.036) (0.034) (1.530) (0.364) (0.163) (0.080)
Log income -0.009 0.001 4.583*** 1.257*** 0.444*** 0.202***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.798) (0.185) (0.104) (0.046)
% Less than HS 0.226*** 0.135*** 14.270*** 4.034*** 1.410*** 0.641***
(0.039) (0.039) (1.958) (0.495) (0.226) (0.097)
% Some college -0.270*** -0.039 -15.526*** -3.049*** -1.826*** -0.779***
(0.043) (0.035) (3.393) (0.658) (0.313) (0.129)
% College degree 0.110** 0.192*** 19.435*** 5.438*** 1.815*** 0.790***
(0.044) (0.039) (3.134) (0.759) (0.354) (0.153)
N 12227 9171 12228 12228 12228 12228
R2 .687 .763 .257 .441 .343 .4
Notes. The table reports OLS estimates of equation 3.4.1 with fixed effects and state time trends. ISP
Providers, our proxy for Internet diffusion, is the number of high speed Internet providers registered in a
county. All donation variables are expressed as dollars donated per capita: Total Donats, Donats<500, Dem
Donats, Dem Donats<500. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients
are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels.
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TABLE 3.4
OLS estimates of all outcomes on ISP growth with lagged dependent variable 1996-2008
% Democrat Turnout Total Donats Dem Dem
donats < $500 donats donats < $500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ISP providers 0.006*** -0.000 -0.011 0.009 0.013 0.012**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.198) (0.031) (0.013) (0.006)
yt−1 0.949*** 0.812*** 0.798*** 0.930*** 2.195*** 2.043***
(0.004) (0.015) (0.212) (0.037) (0.252) (0.432)
Avg. age -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.129*** 0.029*** 0.006*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
% Male -0.072*** -0.253*** -0.046 -0.086 0.102 0.025
(0.015) (0.041) (1.057) (0.238) (0.083) (0.037)
Log pop. density 0.003*** -0.003*** -0.037 -0.026*** -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.041) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001)
% Black 0.086*** 0.077*** 0.112 -0.018 -0.022 -0.011
(0.004) (0.005) (0.294) (0.048) (0.015) (0.008)
% Hispanic 0.073*** -0.020*** 0.075 0.083 -0.055** -0.028**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.539) (0.061) (0.023) (0.012)
% Asian -0.100*** -0.139*** 1.921 0.790 0.745** 0.366**
(0.026) (0.024) (3.556) (0.547) (0.339) (0.177)
% Poverty -0.005 -0.062** 4.967*** 0.789** 0.184* 0.093*
(0.018) (0.030) (1.317) (0.309) (0.106) (0.052)
Log income -0.011*** 0.018*** 2.079*** 0.367*** 0.043 0.020
(0.004) (0.006) (0.486) (0.072) (0.028) (0.014)
% Less than HS -0.055*** -0.041*** 4.129*** 0.738*** 0.187*** 0.079**
(0.011) (0.016) (1.259) (0.208) (0.063) (0.036)
% Some college -0.022** 0.001 -4.224*** -0.649*** -0.460*** -0.261***
(0.011) (0.015) (1.634) (0.215) (0.089) (0.044)
% College degree 0.090*** 0.101*** 11.905*** 2.561*** 0.727*** 0.381***
(0.008) (0.010) (3.134) (0.198) (0.082) (0.049)
N 12226 6114 9171 9171 9171 9171
R2 .95 .923 .567 .768 .744 .669
Notes. The table reports OLS estimates of equation 3.4.1 with a lagged dependent variable, and no fixed effects.
ISP Providers, our proxy for Internet diffusion, is the number of high speed Internet providers registered in a county.
yt−1 is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. All donation variables are expressed as dollars donated per
capita: Total Donats, Donats<500, Dem Donats, Dem Donats<500. See appendix for details on the construction
and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 3.5
First stage relationship between providers and index of ROW laws 1996-2008
Number of Internet providers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ROW index * year2008 0.178*** 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.190*** 0.157***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
ROW index * year2004 0.041 0.051 0.043 0.042 0.023
(0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
ROW index * year2000 0.015 0.017 0.008 0.014 0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Avg. age 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
% Male -1.746*** -2.366*** -2.338*** -1.520***
(0.560) (0.538) (0.541) (0.567)
Log pop. density 0.605*** 0.570*** 0.619*** 0.426***
(0.093) (0.088) (0.089) (0.081)
% Black 2.569*** 2.238*** 1.790***
(0.406) (0.416) (0.378)
% Hispanic 0.114 0.039 -0.157
(0.236) (0.247) (0.257)
% Asian 9.070*** 8.941*** 7.151***
(2.763) (2.782) (2.508)
% Poverty 0.376 0.146
(0.280) (0.273)
Log income -0.392*** -0.389***
(0.095) (0.094)
% Less than HS 1.723***
(0.364)
% Some college -0.477
(0.362)
% College degree 1.814***
(0.436)
F-stat 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14
N 2496 2496 2496 2496 2496
R2 .905 .911 .917 .919 .924
Notes. The table presents OLS estimates of equation 3.4.3. It presents first stage results for the relationship
between Internet diffusion and an index of right-of-way laws interacted with year dummies. The measure
for Internet diffusion is the number of high speed Internet providers registered in a county. Row Index, is
an index gauging the amenability of right-of-way laws in a state to Internet infrastructure investment. The
sample has been limited to counties straddling state borders. See figure 3.1 for a map of counties in the sample.
See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 3.6
Reduced form relationship between democrat share and index of ROW laws 1996-2008
Democratic vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ROW index * year2008 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.058***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
ROW index * year2004 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
ROW index * year2000 0.016** 0.014** 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Avg. age 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Male -0.209 -0.329** -0.326** -0.186
(0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.158)
Log pop. density 0.019 0.016 0.019 -0.013
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
% Black 0.541*** 0.522*** 0.457***
(0.100) (0.102) (0.099)
% Hispanic 0.132* 0.129* 0.104
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
% Asian 0.450 0.440 0.065
(0.319) (0.316) (0.306)
% Poverty -0.002 -0.036
(0.080) (0.078)
Log income -0.026 -0.028
(0.023) (0.023)
% Less than HS 0.209**
(0.088)
% Some college -0.150
(0.092)
% College degree 0.361***
(0.098)
N 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504
R2 .649 .65 .665 .665 .677
Notes. The table presents reduced form regressions of results for the relationship between Democratic can-
didate vote share in U.S. presidential elections and index of right-of-way laws interacted with year dummies.
Row Index, is an index gauging the amenability of right-of-way laws in a state to Internet infrastructure
investment. The sample has been limited to counties straddling state borders. See figure 3.1 for a map of
counties in the sample. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are
reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels.
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TABLE 3.7
IV estimates of democrat share on Internet access 1996-2008
Democrat vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ISP providers 0.323*** 0.304*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.303*** 0.024***
(0.082) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.088) (0.007)
Avg. age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Male 0.327 0.363 0.358 0.283 -0.246*
(0.202) (0.228) (0.227) (0.209) (0.128)
Log pop. density -0.165*** -0.152*** -0.163*** -0.145*** 0.019***
(0.048) (0.044) (0.047) (0.042) (0.003)
% Black -0.213 -0.134 -0.091 0.505***
(0.200) (0.183) (0.184) (0.026)
% Hispanic 0.116* 0.134** 0.171*** 0.072
(0.060) (0.059) (0.064) (0.053)
% Asian -2.189** -2.161** -2.094** -0.136
(0.933) (0.937) (0.940) (0.229)
% Poverty -0.111 -0.079 0.063
(0.102) (0.101) (0.077)
Log income 0.089** 0.091* -0.074***
(0.042) (0.047) (0.020)
% Less than HS -0.305 0.016
(0.189) (0.071)
% Some college 0.002 -0.241***
(0.124) (0.077)
% College degree -0.173 0.117*
(0.205) (0.063)
N 2496 2496 2496 2496 2496 2496
R2 .145 .248 .298 .306 .28 .687
Notes. Specifications (1) through (5) show results of IV regressions of Democratic candidate vote share in U.S.
presidential elections on Internet diffusion from 1996-2008. ISP Providers, our proxy for Internet diffusion, is
the number of high speed Internet providers registered in a county. The instrument is Row index, an index
gauging the amenability of right-of-way laws in a state to Internet infrastructure investment, interacted with
year dummies. The sample has been limited to counties straddling state borders. See figure 3.1 for a map of
counties in the sample. Column (6) shows the OLS results of estimating equation 3.4.1 for the limited sample.
See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 3.8
IV estimates of other outcomes on Internet access 1996-2008
% Democrat Turnout Total Donats Dem Dem
donats < $500 donats donats < $500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ISP providers 0.303*** 0.064 5.004 1.051 0.530** 0.192**
(0.088) (0.040) (3.759) (0.655) (0.243) (0.092)
Avg. age 0.002 -0.003 0.121 0.041** -0.005 -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.108) (0.017) (0.007) (0.002)
% Male 0.283 -0.868*** 16.396 1.977 1.224** 0.204
(0.209) (0.267) (10.272) (1.600) (0.619) (0.243)
Log pop. density -0.145*** -0.083*** -6.097* -0.874** -0.466*** -0.105*
(0.042) (0.030) (3.441) (0.366) (0.176) (0.060)
% Black -0.091 -0.375* -17.008* -3.382** -1.657** -0.534**
(0.184) (0.200) (9.495) (1.487) (0.736) (0.268)
% Hispanic 0.171*** -0.198* -0.970 -0.795 -0.467 -0.179
(0.064) (0.104) (4.339) (0.616) (0.402) (0.150)
% Asian -2.094** 0.273 -13.924 -0.940 -2.342 -0.459
(0.940) (0.575) (41.460) (6.016) (3.202) (1.227)
% Poverty -0.079 0.220*** -0.641 -0.532 -0.462* -0.132
(0.101) (0.078) (3.508) (0.648) (0.262) (0.112)
Log income 0.091* 0.042* 6.674** 1.155*** 0.558** 0.146
(0.047) (0.025) (3.126) (0.391) (0.260) (0.099)
% Less than HS -0.305 0.061 9.338 1.505 0.143 -0.101
(0.189) (0.104) (6.023) (1.420) (0.441) (0.178)
% Some college 0.002 -0.040 -1.147 -0.274 -0.668* -0.321**
(0.124) (0.080) (5.463) (0.987) (0.384) (0.151)
% College degree -0.173 0.236** 9.747 1.489 0.780 0.136
(0.205) (0.097) (7.412) (1.713) (0.586) (0.242)
N 2496 1872 2496 2496 2496 2496
R2 .28 .758 .197 .317 .208 .325
Notes. The table presents instrumental variable estimates of equations 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. ISP Providers, our
proxy for Internet diffusion, is the number of high speed Internet providers registered in a county. The instru-
ment is Row Index, an index gauging the amenability of right-of-way laws in a state to Internet infrastructure
investment, interacted with year dummies. The sample has been limited to counties straddling state borders.
See figure 3.1 for a map of counties in the sample. All donation variables are expressed as dollars donated
per capita: Total Donats, Donats<500, Dem Donats, Dem Donats<500. See appendix for details on the con-
struction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 3.9
Reduced form estimates of democrat share on ROW index for previous years
4Dem 88-92 4Dem 92-96 4Dem 96-00 4Dem 00-04 4Dem 04-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ROW index -0.008 -0.003 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.019***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
N 624 624 624 624 624
R2 .796 .623 .599 .642 .68
Notes. The table presents reduced form regressions of results for the relationship between Democratic
candidate vote share in U.S. presidential elections and index of right-of-way laws interacted with year dummies.
Specifications (1) and (2) look at the relationship during the pre-Internet election period. Specifications (3) to
(5) cover the 1996-2008 period when rapid Internet growth coincided with presidential elections. Row Index,
is an index gauging the amenability of right-of-way laws in a state to Internet infrastructure investment. The
sample has been limited to counties straddling state borders. See figure 3.1 for a map of counties in the sample.
See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coefficients are reported with robust
standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
TABLE 3.10
Placebo OLS estimates of change in democrat vote share on ISP growth
4Dem 88-92 4Dem 92-96 4Dem 96-00 4Dem 00-04 4Dem 04-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ISP providers 0.008 -0.008 0.019***
2004-2008 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
ISP providers 0.004
1996-2000 (0.020)
ISP providers -0.010
2000-2004 (0.009)
N 624 624 624 624 624
R2 .79 .601 .592 .632 .679
Notes. The table reports OLS estimates of equation 3.4.1 with fixed effects and state time trends. Specifica-
tion (1) regresses change in Democratic vote share for 1988-1992 on Internet growth for the 2004-2008 period.
Similarly, specification (2) regresses change in Democratic vote share for 1992-1996 on Internet growth for the
2004-2008 period. Specifications (3) to (5) regress change in Democratic vote share on change in Internet in
the same time period. ISP Providers, our proxy for Internet diffusion, is the number of high speed Internet
providers registered in a county. See appendix for details on the construction and sources of variables. Coeffi-
cients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels.
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3.7 Data Appendix
Data Descriptions and Sources
Variable Description Source
Original Variables
% Democrat Share of the vote won by the presidential candidate
from the Democratic Party.
uselectionatlas.org
(1988, 1992, 1996,
2000, 2004, 2008)
Avg. age; % Male;
Black; Asian; Hispanic
Respectively, average age; percentage male;
percentage black; percentage asian; and percentage
hispanic. Percentage white is omitted.
U.S. Census
Bureau (1988,
1992, 1996, 2000,
2004, 2008)
% Poverty; Log
income
Percentage of population below poverty line and log
of income. For data not collected on exact year of
election applied to closest election year.
U.S. Census
Bureau (1989,
1993, 1996, 2000,
2004, 2008)
Log high-speed lines
per capita
Log of high-speed lines per capita at the state level. FCC (1988, 1992,
1996, 2000, 2004,
2008)
Generated Variables
Log pop density Log of County population divided by square
kilomoters area.
U.S. Census
Bureau (1988,
1992, 1996, 2000,
2004, 2008)
% Less than HS; Some
college; % College
degree
Respectively, Percentage of population with less
than High School degree; percentage with some
years of College; percentage with College degree.
Percentage with High School degree is omitted.
Some data not collected on election years. Average
between 1980 and 1990 used to calculate 1988
control. Average between 1990 and 2000 used both
for 1992 and 1996 control. Average between 2000
and 2006-2010 used for 2004.
U.S. Census
Bureau (1980,
1990, 2000,
2006-2010)
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Turnout Number of votes cast divided by estimation of
voting age population.
uselectionatlas.org
(1988, 1992, 1996,
2000, 2004, 2008);
U.S. Census
Bureau (1988,
1992, 1996, 2000,
2004, 2008)
Total donats; Donats
< $500; Dem donats;
Dem donats < $500
Donation data aggregated from zip code to county
level and then divided by county population.
Respectively per capita total donations to both
parties; per capita donations to both parties under
$500; per capita donations to Democratic Party; per
capita donations under $500 to Democratic Party.
FEC (1988, 1992,
1996, 2000, 2004,
2008)
ISP providers Number of ISP providers registered to a county.
Raw data is at the zip code level. Aggregated to
county level via population weighted average. Value
is divided by 10.
FCC (1988, 1992,
1996, 2000, 2004,
2008)
ROW index Index measuring the relative favorability of
right-of-way laws to Internet infrastructure
investment. Index at state level and is out of one
hundred. See Section 3.3.3 for details on laws.
TechNet (2002);
Analysis
Consulting (2002)
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